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Abstract 
 
The Swiss foreign policy offers a deviant case. Most countries that were neutral 
during the Cold War have during the last decades become more cooperative, while 
Switzerland on the other hand still contains a rather stable foreign policy. Because 
traditional theories in International Politics offer no concrete explanation to this 
puzzle, I have been oriented towards decision-making theories in domestic 
politics. The research questions were explored through two case studies. The first 
case study analysing the veto player structures in the Swiss security reports 1973-
2010 with help of Tsebelis Veto Player Theory (1995). Finding that not all 
institutional veto players favoured the proposed changes in the security reports. 
The consent of all three veto players is however necessary in order to change a 
policy, leading therefore to no change. The second case study examines the 
agenda-setting process in the UN membership proposal in 1986 with help of 
Kingdon´s Multiple Stream Framework (1995). Finding that the prominent actors 
in the governmental agenda and the decision agenda differed, explaining therefore 
why the UN membership was rejected. In both case studies the people through the 
referendum’s where identified as the most sufficient factor influencing the 
decision-making process in the Swiss foreign policy. 
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1 Introduction 
The end of the cold war, and thereby the end of bipolarity, has had a great 
impact on foreign policy. The external security environment and international 
order has changed and with that new possibilities in foreign policy have 
emerged. Especially the European Security environment has undergone major 
changes during the past two decades. One important factor that has contributed 
to these changes is the European Union. During the last decades the EU has 
increased its amount of member states progressively, which has made the EU 
increasingly an important actor in foreign policy.  
Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden were all neutral during the Cold 
War, during the last decades they have become more cooperative by joining the 
EU and in line revised their Security Policy towards EU: s priorities. As a 
consequence neutrality has in these countries successively over gone to non-
alignment (Agius-Devine, 2011, Goetschel, 1999). Switzerland, on the other 
hand has since the end of the Cold War not abandoned its longstanding foreign 
policy. Switzerland is neither member in the European Union nor in the NATO, 
and became only recently member in the United Nations. 
The Swiss foreign policy offers a puzzle in foreign policy, in order to 
understand why we first need to take a look at the source, which is found in the 
context: decreasing territorial problems, greater interdependence between 
European States and increasing involvement of the EU and the NATO in foreign 
policy. The following events have contributed to examine the purpose of 
neutrality in the aftermath of the Cold War. Different theoretical assumptions are 
stated in the academic debate regarding neutrality. For instant Rickli argues in 
his article that small European states have two security policy alternatives, either 
to be cooperative by joining a security institution as for example the EU or 
NATO, or to join ad-hoc coalitions (2008:308). This argument highlights that 
neutrality today is an unnecessary strategy because of the changes in the 
international environment. Switzerland’s foreign policy offers therefore a 
problem in the topic of foreign policy. Traditional theories in International 
Politics contribute with no useful explanations to the question: why Switzerland 
since the end of the cold war still holds on to neutrality and is rather isolated in 
World Politics. 
The changes in the international relations in foreign policy in the 1990s 
called the attention of scholars to explain this changing process (Rosati, 1994, 
Holsti, 1982, Gustavsson, 1998, Hermann, 1990, Goldmann, 1988). As a result a 
variety of different models were developed that aimed to explain foreign policy 
change. This thesis has made use of these contributions when searching for 
explanatory factors. Arguing that the variables influencing foreign policy change 
also contribute with explanations about why these variables had no impact on 
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the Swiss foreign policy decision-making process. However, the models contain 
no theoretical elements therefore this thesis consumes theories outside the field 
of foreign policy. This thesis uses Tsebelis’ Veto Player Theory (1995) and 
Kingdon’s Multiple Stream Framework (1984), both established and prominent 
theories in political science, however rather rarely tested in the topic of foreign 
policy. I argue that both theories make use of the explanatory factors suggested 
by the scholars in the field of foreign policy change, however focusing on 
different perspective.  
The purpose of this thesis is to understand and explain indecisions in the 
Swiss foreign policy. It is impossible to explain all types of foreign policy; the 
ambition of this thesis is therefore too explain two particular decision-making 
processes in the Swiss foreign policy. The Swiss foreign policy offers two 
deviant events in the decision-making process.  
First, in most political systems the government has a great influence on the 
decision-making process, meanwhile in Switzerland the government serves 
rather as a mediator. Switzerland is therefore often viewed as something 
extraordinary due because of its institutional settings as direct democracy, the 
government coalition and the extensive vertical and horizontal power sharing, 
which has been studied in various research before (Kriesi, 1998, Linder, 1994, 
Neidhart, 1970). In international comparison, Lijphart argues that Switzerland is 
the prime example of a “consensus democracy” (Lijphart, 1999:249). As 
mentioned before Swiss foreign policy has historically rather been a consensus 
topic, the majority of politicians favour neutrality because of its success during 
the World War I and World War II (Hagmann, 2010). Because the Swiss 
Political Institutions are often described as special (Wenger, 2008, Linder, 
2005), I argue it is therefore theoretically relevant to examine the Swiss political 
institutions closer. Analysing the decision-making process in the Swiss setting as 
well as the actors within. However, rather drawing on Lijphart´s “consensus 
democracy” I am going to use Tsebelis’ Veto Player Theory. The theory 
contributes with plausible explanations about veto player structures in the Swiss 
political institution and how actors hold veto power influencing the policy 
outcome. Therefore I argue that the Swiss foreign policy indicates an important 
case within foreign policy, namely that security strategies are not always formed 
because of events in the international level but rather because of domestic 
politics. 
Second, Switzerland adopted permanent neutrality at the Vienna Congress 
in the year 1815 (admin.ch). Neutrality was first reinforced in order to secure 
Switzerland´s sovereignty from the surrounding neighbours and later served as a 
diplomatic innovation. Neutrality has been a positive experience for Switzerland 
during the Franco-German war, the World War I and World War II. Historically 
the Swiss foreign policy is rather a restrained topic in domestic politics, contains 
no bigger disagreement (Hirschi, et al. 2005). However in the early 1970s 
foreign policy became a heated debate, mainly because actors from the left-wing 
advocated to join the United Nations in order to become more cooperative in the 
international arena.  This debate dominated the Swiss political agenda for 
decades and as Hagman underlines: ”by the turn of the millennium, 
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disagreements had risen to such levels that scholars diagnosed an unprecedented 
and alarming erosion of the national security policy consensus” (2010:249).  
In the debate two main disagreements were found. First, politicians 
debated about the meaning of Security Policy in the aftermath of World War II. 
The conservative traditional politicians arguing for a traditional military 
strategy, meanwhile the government together with the majority of politicians 
favouring a policy that could meet the new security threats in the international 
environment. The second disagreement was about how to approach the Swiss 
security policy, the traditional conservatives emphasising the maintenance of 
neutrality, meanwhile the government favoured cooperation with international 
organizations as for example the European Union and United Nations. As 
underlined before the conservative parties favoured neutrality and emphasised a 
military centred security policy. The Swiss People`s party was the smallest party 
in the Swiss Federal Council, during the 1970s and was primarily popular in 
rural cantons. However in the 1990s under the influence of Christoph Blocher 
the party underwent structural and ideological changes and got highly engaged 
in the UN debate and made later foreign policy their main interest. Being the 
smallest party in the federal council in the beginning of the 1990s in the year 
1999 at the national elections, SVP increased its popularity and became the 
strongest party in Switzerland. With help of Kingdon´s multiple stream model 
(1984), I will analyse not only how the UN membership became an important 
issue in the political agenda but also how individual actors influenced the 
decision-making process and the development of this. 
1.1 The Aim and Research Questions 
This study has the empirical aim, to test two plausible explanations offered in 
the decision-making literature. Therefore this thesis is separated into two case 
studies, both of which use one of the frames of reference when searching for 
explanations to the research question. This research highlights central issues in 
the Swiss foreign policy decision-making process, which deepens the 
understanding of Switzerland´s foreign policy and contributes with theoretical 
explanation in new topics. Meanwhile the theoretical aim is to make a 
contribution to the study of decision-making in foreign policy.  
 The general research question is outlined as followed: 
• How can the decision-making process in Swiss foreign policy be 
explained?  
In order to answer this overall research question I have formulated two 
separate sub-questions, which give the outline for each case study.  
Case study 1 aims to answer the following sub-question: 
• What plausible explanations can Tsebelis’ Veto Player Theory contribute 
with in the Swiss Federal Assembly debate regarding the Swiss Security 
Report, 1973, 1990, 2000, 2010? 
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Case study 2 aims to answer the following sub-question: 
• What plausible explanations can Kingdon´s Multiple Stream Framework 
contribute with in the 1986 UN debate? 
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2 Theoretical Framework 
 
 
“We should not ask what goals account for a nation´s choice of action, but 
rather what factors determine an outcome (…)” 
    Allison, 1971:253 
    
 
The theoretical framework is established with help of theoretical discussions of 
decision-making processes in foreign policy as well as theoretical explanations 
outside the field. This chapter begins with an overview of previous studies in the 
field of foreign policy. Following a discussion about the contributions of the 
topic foreign policy change to this thesis. In the final part of this chapter 
Tsebelis´Veto Player Theory and Kingdon´s Mutliple Stream Framework are 
presented, each of which serve separately as a theoretical explanation to the 
phenomena Swiss foreign policy stability.  
2.1 Foreign Policy as a field of research 
This research has the intention to make a contribution to the topic of foreign 
policy. Foreign policy is a classical topic within the studies of political science; 
offering a selection of different perspectives. Most studies in foreign policy try 
to explain action taken by states or individual units (Gustavsson, 1998:16). 
Within the studies of foreign policy one main disagreement is found, namely 
whether action is dependent on external sources or internal sources. To put it in 
another way, whether action is influenced by international affairs or because of 
domestic politics. 
The traditional theories in foreign policy engage in security issues rather 
on the international level. The so-called rational actor assumption has been the 
main focus in studies about foreign policy strategies; especially the realistic 
perspective has dominated this topic. The main argument here is that states adapt 
and change their political structure due to world politics (Dunne in Baylis, 
2008:96). One of the most influential scholars within realism is Kenneth Waltz 
(1979), who argues that foreign policy strategies are formed because of the 
structure of the international system. Waltz only takes into account international 
factors and argues even further that domestic explanations play no role or only a 
minor role in states foreign policy strategy. I criticise Waltz´s theory because his 
arguments are far to general, the realist approach cannot explain why 
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Switzerland in the aftermath of the Cold War still is rather restricted in World 
Politics. The prominent realist Mearsheimer also argues that all states try to 
maximize their power at the costs of other states (2001:20). For this 
Mearsheimer has been criticised by scholars (Keohane, 1986, Ostrom-Job, 
1986). Keohane emphasises: “States concerned with self preservation do not 
seek to maximize their power when they are not in danger” (1986:174). I agree 
with the critics, arguing that not all states try to maximize their power by 
adapting to the changes in the world order, as the Swiss case implies status quo 
states are present. The Rational Actor perspective offers though explanations 
about the process from non-alignment to cooperation, with reference to the 
systemic structure. For instance Rickli explains this process with help of the 
international level, arguing that small European states have in the aftermath of 
the Cold War two security policy alternatives: either to be cooperative by joining 
a security institution as for example the EU or NATO, or to join ad-hoc 
coalitions (2008:308). Other rationalist scholars argue that “post-neutrality” is a 
logical step in the aftermath of bipolarity and a result of new security demands 
(Huldt, 1995, Cox - MacGinty, 1996, Dahl, 1997, Missiroli, 2003). 
Switzerland, on the other hand, has since the end of the Cold War not 
abandoned it´s longstanding policy of non-alignment and not fully taken part in 
the European Integration process, which makes the rationalist assumption in the 
Swiss case superfluous. The realistic assumption assumes further that the state is 
a unitary actor, this statement ignores however that individual actors within the 
state create foreign policy and that the state rather consists of a variety of 
different actors. Hermann defines a foreign policy as: a problem-oriented or a 
goal oriented program established by policymakers with the aim to meet 
problems that exist outside the policymaking environment (1990:5). The 
traditional theories, as discussed, offer no explanation to why the Swiss foreign 
policy is stable in the aftermath of the Cold War. Therefore concentrating on 
forces within the state, in the domestic politics. As Hermann emphasises: 
“foreign policy is established by policymaker” (1990:5), foreign policy is 
therefore seen as a process of decision-making and explains the actions taken by 
policymakers.  
Explaining foreign policy with help of decision-making process is a 
prominent explanation style within the study of foreign policy and often referred 
to as the “Foreign Policy Decision Making” (FDPM). As Lagon underlines: 
 
The State is not in fact a unitary rational actor responding mechanically to 
an international equilibrium or to some clearly definable objective interests. 
Real, live human leaders must answer these questions. The national interest 
is the product of the subjective beliefs of elites, not of objective theory  
                 (Lagon, 1992:65) 
 
Similar conclusions where drawn in the work of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, they 
argued that foreign policy was the outcome of the decision-makers subjective 
interpretation of the situation rather than the influence of international forces 
(1962:14-185). Arguing further that: “the key to the explanation of why the state 
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behaves as it does lies in the way its decision-makers as actors define their 
situations” (Snyder, et.al. 1962:65). Another influential approach in foreign 
policy decision-making is the concept of bounded rationality, first introduced by 
Herbert Simon (1983). Simon argues that the structure in which solutions are 
considered affect the outcome of the decision. He focuses on the individual 
level, claiming that action in foreign policy depend on the decisions made by 
human beings (1983:12). Simon (1983) and Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1962) 
contribute with essential insights when explaining state actions, action is taken 
because decision-makers inside the government chose to take action. Foreign 
policy can therefore not be seen an objective force driven by a common 
goal/interest, but rather the outcome of decision-makers subjective interpretation 
of a situation leading to a foreign policy action or no action.  
The traditional theories in the field of foreign policy have contributed with 
rather few theoretical explanations about the changes in the world order; this led 
to the emergence of the constructivist approach in the field of foreign policy. 
The Copenhagen School, with Barry Buzan as the main contributor to the field, 
is the most prominent approach building on constructivism. Buzan argues that 
the concept security has become much more multifaceted and needs to be 
refined (Buzan, 1991:8). Buzan underlines that a “broader framework of 
security” will include the important aspects like environmental, economical, 
military, political and societal security (1991:20). The scholars have primarily 
explored  “societal security” and it´s relation to societal identity when explaining 
foreign policy. Such as the work of Christine Agius (2011), she explains the 
politics of “post-neutral” states with help of a constructivist approach. Agius 
argues that the move from neutrality to post-neutrality shifted not only because 
of the emergence of new security threats, as underlined by rationalist scholars, 
but rather because of the involvement of ideas of the self and subjectivity 
(2011:384). Agius and Devine emphasise that it is questionable whether 
neutrality or military non-alignment has any strategic or security value 
(2011:266). That is why most scholars use European integration theory when 
explaining foreign policy change, examining the dynamics of interaction and 
norm exchange between the member states (Gstöhl, 2002, Goetschel, 1999, 
Rieker 2004).  
Widmer argues that dualism, the separation of economics and politics in 
Switzerland, has shaped the identity formation process of Switzerland as highly 
heterogeneous in terms of politics, culture and religion (2008:214). Viewing the 
Swiss foreign policy as a social construction could explain why Switzerland 
since the end of the cold war still emphasises the same policy even though it’s 
from a security perspective unnecessary. The Swiss foreign policy has been 
explained with help of the constructivist perspective in various academically 
contributions, therefore I argue that a saturation has been reached arguing that 
other explanatory variables need to be explored more in depth. The 
constructivist approach has further been criticised for viewing society as a single 
value or interest so assumes that the common values of the state is the only 
object of threat (McSweeney, 1996:90-91). As previous indicated, viewing the 
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state as a single actor misses one important factor, namely that the state holds 
different interests and values.  
As the theory discussion specifies no grand theory dominates the research 
field foreign policy. As a result researchers tend to focus on various explanatory 
factors when analysing foreign policies. A prominent example is Allison´s 
(1971) study: “The Essence of Decision” explaining the outcome of the Cuban 
Missile crisis with help of three theoretical “lenses”: the organizational 
behaviour, the governmental politics and the rational actor. The result of 
Allison´s research indicates, “the conceptual angles present a number of 
significant differences in emphasis and interpretation” (1971:379). This research 
has been inspired by the work of Allison in the way that many factors influence 
foreign policy and thereby provide broad explanations about the policy. In this 
research I will make use of various explanatory factors provided in the domestic 
level. Although, I am aware that is impossible to make use of a theoretical 
framework that explains all types of foreign policy. The ambition of this 
research is so to analyse two distinct decision-making processes in the Swiss 
foreign policy, both of which uses one of the frame of reference when searching 
for explanations.  
In the next chapter I will discuss which alternative explanations are offered 
in the field of foreign policy when studying Swiss foreign policy stability.  
2.2 The Study of Foreign Policy stability 
The changes in the international relations in foreign policy in the 1990s called 
the attention of scholars to explain this changing process. As a result a variety of 
different models were developed that aimed to explain foreign policy change see 
for example, Rosati (1994), Holsti (1982), Hermann (1990), Goldmann (1988) 
and Gustavsson (1998). However, because Switzerland has not adapted to these 
changes I will use these models as premises in order to discover the dependent 
variables. Arguing here that the variables leading to change also explain if they 
were present in the Swiss foreign policy and why they had only little or no 
impact on the decision-making process. In this study I analyse foreign policy 
stability defined by Tsebelis’ as: “the impossibility of significantly changing the 
status quo” (1995:2), rather than the direction of change. Most of the models 
include the international level in their analyses, in this study I will only focus on 
variables offered in the domestic level, as discussed earlier. As Goldmann states: 
“domestic factors are generally taken to include the beliefs on which foreign 
policies are based as well as the governmental apparatus by which they are 
implemented, monitored and revised” (1988:39). 
Goldmann discusses how so-called stabilizers protect foreign policy from 
change (1988:43). The stabilizers are institutionalization explaining the 
commitment of the government towards a policy, support indicates the degree 
on which advocates mobilize support for the changing policy and salience 
signifies the degree of domestic power struggle (Goldmann, 1988:44). Hermann 
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developed a model explaining foreign policy change with help of graduated 
levels. Hermann emphasises that two changes need to occur in order for a 
foreign policy to change, change in the international system, and further that the 
systematic change triggers change in the domestic politics (Hermann, 1990:11). 
The independent variables influencing the decision-making process are: leader 
driven, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring and external shocks 
(Hermann, 1990:11-13). In this research I will overlook the variable external 
shock presented by Hermann (1990:12), as the ambition is to explain Swiss 
foreign policy stability with help of domestic variables rather than international 
variables. Another factor that offers no explanation in this research is the 
variable leader driven (Hermann, 1990:11). Switzerland contains no 
authoritative policymaker as the political power is shared by seven members in 
the council described as a multi-party government (admin.ch). In Hermann’s 
model the other two remaining elements have drawn my attention: domestic 
restructuring and bureaucratic advocacy (1990:11-12).  Domestic restructuring 
referring here to society whose support is required in order to govern (Hermann, 
1990:11-12). Bureaucratic advocacy on the other side referring to groups within 
the government that advocate a redirection in the foreign policy (Hermann, 
1990:11-12), similar to Goldmann’s stabilizer support and therefore suggesting 
the same explanation. Analysing the factors explaining foreign policy change 
will not only provide knowledge about the determinants leading to change but 
also provide explanations about why these variables have no impact on the 
Swiss foreign policy. Further offering plausible explanations about stability in 
the Swiss foreign policy.  
Both models offer a broad perspective about foreign policy, including the 
international as well as the domestic level, when explaining the decision-making 
process in foreign policy. Critic has been directed towards the vagueness in 
Hermann’s model, the model contains no hypothesis about which factor is more 
important than others, serving therefore as a model rather than a theory 
(Gustavsson, 1998:19). Goldmann on the other side points out that the stabilizers 
might vary between different types of political systems and should therefore be 
threated on ad-hoc basis (Gustavsson, 1998:20). Both Goldmann and Hermann’s 
model serve in this study as directives, contributing with knowledge about the 
factors determining the decision-making process in foreign policy. However 
because the models are rather vague I use these models as a starting point in 
order to find a suitable theoretical framework.  
As previous implied, I view foreign policy as a process of decision-making 
so analysing the factors that influence the decision-making process in domestic 
politics. The international level offers no plausible explanation to why the Swiss 
foreign policy is stable. Goldmann and Hermann contribute with various factors 
explaining foreign policy change. In order to analyse these elements more in 
depth I have chosen Tsebelis’ Veto Player theory (1995) and Kingdon’s Multiple 
Stream Framework (1984). Both theories can provide an understanding about the 
decision-making process at the national level and its impact on policy outcome. 
As earlier discussed it is impossible to make use of a theoretical framework that 
is capable of explaining all types of foreign policy, which explains why there is 
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no grand theory in foreign policy. The ambition of this research is therefore 
rather two explain two particular decision-making processes in the Swiss foreign 
policy, the first event with help of Tsebelis’ Veto Player Theory and the second 
event with help of Kingdon’s Multiple Stream Framework. As earlier stated, this 
research will therefore analyse two events in the Swiss foreign policy decision-
making separately, using in each case a different theoretical framework.  
First, the institutional setting in Switzerland is often described as special it 
is therefore interesting to analyse the causal dynamic between veto player 
structures and foreign policy. As Hermann underlines, actors within the 
government can advocate a redirection in foreign policy and thereby influence 
the decision-making process. Analysing the veto player structures in the Swiss 
political system can provide explanations about whether the actors advocating 
change or actors favouring the status quo are favoured in the decision-making 
process. Hermann’s second element, the role of the society in the decision-
making is considered in the theory as well, especially when identifying the veto 
players. Goldmann’s variables are studied as well, analysing the veto player 
structures in the Swiss political system will expose the veto players commitment 
to the foreign policy and the degree of support for the advocates favouring 
change. Salience is explained in the Veto Player theory when analysing internal 
cohesion and ideological difference among veto players.  
Second, the Swiss UN debate in 1986 is often described as the 
commencement of a heated debate in the Swiss foreign policy, as described in 
the introductory. Politicians within the Swiss government advocated a change in 
the Swiss foreign policy by joining the United Nations. Hermann’s bureaucratic 
advocacy can thereby be analysed with help of Kingdon’s Multiple Stream 
Framework. Analysing the agenda-setting process will provide with plausible 
explanations about how advocates make use of events and themes in order to 
push their ideas to the front and so influencing the decision-making process. 
Hermann’s domestic restructuring can be analysed with help of Kingdon’s 
theory when analysing the decision-agenda. In the light of Switzerland’s direct-
democracy the advocates require the support of the people, analysing the 
decision-agenda will provide with essential information’s. Goldmann’s variables 
institutionalization and support are realized when analysing the 
policyentrepreneurs and their influence on the agenda-setting process. If the 
advocates manage to put their issue on the agenda it indicates that there is a great 
support for the policy. Institutionalization on the other hand, is contemplated 
when analysing the decision-agenda and especially focusing on legislative 
enactment. The last stabilizer salience is in Kingdon´s model examined when 
analysing the agenda setting process within as well as outside. 
Both theoretical frameworks are prominent theories in political science, 
however rather rarely tested in the field of foreign policy. I argue that this is a 
strength contributing with new explanations to the field. The usages of both 
theoretical frameworks contribute with a broader understanding of the Swiss 
foreign policy stability. Provides further an in-depth understanding of the veto 
player structures in the Swiss security report (1973, 1990, 2000, 2010) and the 
agenda-setting process in the 1986 UN membership debate. The research field 
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foreign policy contains no prominent theory explaining foreign policy stability, 
in line with that the traditional theories offer no plausible explanation this thesis 
will therefore make us of established theories outside the field. The discussion 
about the research field “foreign policy change” contributed with knowledge 
about where to search for independent variables in the Swiss domestic politics. 
The next chapter presents and discusses Tsebelis’ Veto Player Theory and 
Kingdon’s Multiple Stream Framework more in detail.  
 
 
Table 1, The causal dynamics of foreign policy change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Tsebelis’ Veto Player Theory 
The veto player theory was first introduced by George Tsebelis in 1995, and has 
in contemporary research become an established approach explaining policy 
outcomes (Ganghof – Bräuniger, 2006, Keefer – Stasavage, 2003, Busemeyer, 
2005). Tsebelis’ theory explains policy outcomes by exploring the veto player 
structures in political systems.  
In most political systems the government is the highest executive authority, 
however in the Swiss political system the Federal Council (government) has 
only reduced influence over the decision making process.  The executive serves 
more as a mediator for the legislative arena (Linder, 2005:222). In light of 
federalism the political power is rather found in the legislative, as the supreme 
power in Switzerland (admin.ch). The constitutional rule differs thereby in 
Switzerland from other countries, the decision-making process cannot be 
examined with the help of classical institutional theories as those found in the 
works of Rhodes (1995), North, (1990), Knight (1992) or March - Olsen (1984). 
Tsebelis’ has contributed with a great empirical foundation; the veto player 
framework can be applied on any political system. As Tsebelis underlines: “The 
veto player theory enables the reader to study and analyze the political systems 
regardless of the level of their institutional complexity” (1995:2). Contributing to 
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consistency, namely that the same arguments are applied on any country and any 
level of analysis (Tsebelis, 1995:2).  
The main argument made by Tsebelis and at the same time serving as the 
definition of veto players is: “in order to change policies, or (…) to change the 
(legislative) status quo, a certain number of individual or collective actors have 
to agree to the proposed change” (1995:2). The veto players are therefore 
specified in the constitution or in the political system (Tsebelis, 1995:13). 
Emphasising further, that political actors ability to influence policies is 
dependent on the institutional setting, the political system generates hurdles for 
the actors and so influencing the decision making process (1995:23). The 
differences between political systems are created because of the veto player 
structures; it is in this theoretical assumption that Tsebelis’ theory differs from 
other contributions in the literature on political institutions.   
The veto players are the independent variables; meanwhile the capacity 
for policy stability is the dependent variable (Tsebelis, 1995:289). The 
dependent variable can be anything from a distinct policy change, as for example 
the UN membership policy, to a potential change in direction in a policy area as 
for example the process from non-alignment to cooperation. Tsebelis differs 
between two different veto players, the institutional veto players, the actors 
whose agreement is a requirement in order change a policy, and the partisan 
veto players identified as the political parties (1995:24). Institutional veto 
players play a sufficient role in the decision making process, a policy outcome is 
therefore dependent on the veto players. The partisan veto players are the 
governmental parties (Tsebelis, 1995:392). As Tsebelis further underlines their 
consent is “(…) neither necessary nor sufficient” (1995:302).  
Tsebelis introduces further the absorption rule (Tsebelis, 1995:310), if 
the partisan majorities are identical in the upper and lower chamber than the 
institutional veto players are counted as one rather than two. Tsebelis’ main 
focus is towards the institutional veto players and the partisan veto players, 
underlining though that political system contains also other important veto 
players. These veto players vary from policy area to policy area and are 
sometimes difficult to identify. As Tsebelis underlines “in case studies one must 
identify all the relevant veto players” (1995:308), this is important in this thesis, 
as the aim is to study veto player structures in a case study. Other veto players 
emphasised in Tsebelis´ framework are for example interest groups and the 
referendum. In this thesis the role of the referendum is important, however the 
usage of it differs from other countries. In the light of the Swiss direct 
democracy the referendum is continuously embedded in the Swiss political 
system and therefore in this thesis not considered as an other veto player. The 
referendum reflects the opinion of the people in the decision-making process, 
and introduces therefore an important veto player (Hug-Tsebelis, 2002:446). The 
referendum on its own says little, rather who controls it, examining who initiates 
the referendum, if the same actor asks the questions as well as initiates the 
referendum, then the referendum eliminates all other veto players (Hug – 
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Tsebelis, 2002:447). Actors can mobilize the support of the people in the 
referendum with help of campaigns. Interest groups refer to actors outside the 
government that become influential in the decision-making process. In 
Switzerland the interest groups are often involved in the electoral level, in the 
referendums as for example mobilizing campaigns (Linder, 2005:12).  
Tsebelis names three important constraints that influence the dependent 
variable, moving the policy towards the status quo or towards the direction of 
change. The numbers of veto players, or the amount of institutional veto players 
has a significant impact on policy outcomes (see table 2). The higher the number 
of veto player’s the smaller the so-called winset for policy change (Tsebelis, 
1995:14). The winset explores the probability of beating the status quo, the 
greater the winset the greater the possibility of changing a policy, stability is 
therefore defined by the size of the winset (Tsebelis, 1995:8).  
 
Table 2, Identification of institutional veto players 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second point of interest is the ideological distance between the veto 
players (Tsebelis, 1995:8). The greater the ideological distance among the veto 
players, the smaller the winset against the status quo. The third point of interest 
is internal cohesion, essential when analysing the institutional veto players in 
particular if they are collective actors, as for example the upper and lower 
chamber in the USA. The higher the internal cohesion between collective veto 
players, the higher the probability of blocking policy changes.  
In most empirical analysis the two later constraints are left aside, 
however I argue that the interaction between these constraints are essential when 
analysing veto player structures. The amount of veto player tells us little about 
policy outcomes; meanwhile ideological distance and internal cohesion 
contribute with explanations about the complexity in the decision-making 
process between the veto players. 
Even though Tsebelis´ theory is prominent in political science a variety 
of scholars have criticised some of the assumptions stated in the theory. 
Tsebelis´s assumes that political actors are primarily policy-seeking, however 
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Jochem (2003), Busemeyer (2005) and Ganghof (2003) argue that by specifying 
this preference other important preferences are left aside, as for example office- 
or vote seeking. Ganghof underlines that “policies are means rather than ends” 
(2003:10), claiming that policies are used by politicians in order to get votes or 
getting elected in the government. I argue that this criticism has only little 
impact on my case. The executive is in Switzerland constituted by collective 
heads rather than a unitary actor. The four biggest parties form the seven-
member executive; it is the legislative that elects the members in the Federal 
Council. The preferences vote- and office seeking are therefore not a matter of 
great importance in this thesis. 
2.3.1 Analytical Framework 
The theoretical discussions presented in this chapter will contribute with an 
understanding on how to make use of Tsebelis veto player theory. In order to 
explore plausible explanations provided by Tsebelis, the following framework 
has been designed.  
 
Table 3, Analytical framework veto player structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Kingdon’s Multiple Stream Framework 
Kingdon presented in 1984 the multiple stream framework, which was 
considered to be a refreshing contribution to the field of policy-making. In 
Kingdon’s framework multiple sources affect the agenda-setting and the 
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decision-making process, analysing actors within as well as outside the 
government. Zahariadis explains multiple streams as: 
 
” a lens, perspective, or framework (…) that explains how policies are made by 
national governments under conditions of ambiguity” 
            (in Sabatier, 2007:65) 
 
Kingdon developed in “Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies” a theory 
that explains how an issue becomes an issue and thereby is put on the agenda. 
Kingdon explains the entire process starting with floating ideas and ending with 
the implementation of a policy (Kingdon, 2011:3). Even though Kingdon 
describes the entire process, he places special emphasis on the two first 
processes: how subjects become prominent on the policy agenda and why some 
alternatives are preferred over others (Kingdon, 2011:3). Kingdon’s multiple 
stream framework is influenced by the garbage can model, developed by Cohen, 
March and Olsen (1972). The model divides problems, solutions and decision-
makers from each other; this was a major breakthrough in traditional decision-
theory. However, Kingdon revised the garbage can model, focusing on 
understanding agenda-setting in the federal government. Kingdon provides a 
theoretical framework that not only captures the decision making process in one 
area, as for example in the parliament, but rather in the entire policy community. 
In order to conceptualize the dynamic process of agenda-setting, Kingdon 
developed the multiple stream framework, the process is viewed in three parallel 
streams: politics, policy and problem (illustrated in figure 4). 
The first policy stream, politics reflects for instance: national mood, election 
results, parliamentary party division, governmental forming (Kingdon, 
2011:145). The developments in the political stream have major implications on 
the political agenda. However, alone these political events have only little 
presence, it is in combination with the problem stream that these events become 
prominent issues and are so put on the agenda.  
In the second stream, problem we can find so called exceptional events that 
draw the attention of governmental decision-makers and that demand political 
action (Kingdon, 2011:90). Those problems are often interpreted differently by 
actors and so leading to different outcomes, especially evident in the national 
opinion. How a problem is portrayed is further also dependable on the possibility 
of solving the problem with different solutions (Knaggård, 2009:97). Identifying 
a problem is therefore a significant component in agenda-setting process. 
 The third stream, policy presents the different solutions and ideas 
formulated by the policy-makers in order to solve real or potential problems 
(Kingdon, 2011:116). Kingdon describes the policy stream as: “ideas that search 
for problems” (Kingdon, 2006:117), similar to the idea presented in the garbage 
can model. This model illustrates the process with help of solutions that float 
around in the universe until they land in the garbage can (Cohen, March, Olsen, 
1972:13). Kingdon on the other side argues that solutions not only happen to 
land in the garbage can by coincidence, but rather as a result of the competition 
between prominent actors in the agenda-setting process (Kingdon, 2011:172). 
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The three streams are considered to interconnect; at the same time they flow 
around independently (Kingdon, 2011:145). Not all issues that find themselves 
on the agenda have coupled the streams. However, in order to mobilize and keep 
an issue prioritized on the political agenda, all three streams need to be coupled 
in the window of opportunity (see figure 4).  
The window of opportunity is only open for a short time and a necessity to 
launch an idea in order to put it on the political agenda. A window opens because of 
changes in the political stream, for instance change in governmental administration. 
This event influences the partisan distribution in the parliament and/or national 
mood (Kingdon, 2011:166). A window can also open if a new problem attracts the 
politicians, or other governmental officials, attention (Kingdon, 2011:166). If a 
particular event opens the window of opportunity than it is also likely that other 
similar issues are put on the political agenda, so called spill-overs (Kingdon, 
2011:190). Politicians often see this as an opportunity, proposing similar solutions 
to problems, as the efforts are beginning to bear fruits. 
The prominent actors in Kingdon´s multiple stream model are the 
policyentrepreneurs, actors that are aware of the possibility of actively coupling 
problems with their own solution (Kingdon, 2011:179). Entrepreneurs are willing to 
invest resources as for example: time, energy, reputation, and money. They invest 
these resources in order to promote their policy position; in addition they hope that 
their efforts get paid off in form of material or solidary benefits (Kingdon, 
2011:179). Successful policyentrepreneurs are authoritative and stubborn, have 
access to a great network and possess unique negotiation skills (Kingdon, 
2011:180.181).  
Kingdon´s multiple stream framework (1995) is an established theory in the 
field of policy studies, notwithstanding the logics and conclusions drawn in the 
multiple stream model are criticised by other scholars. Because Kingdon´s model is 
based on the garbage can model, a lot of the criticism directed towards Cohen, 
March and Olsen are directed against Kingdon as well. Many scholars criticise the 
garbage-can model, as it is built on assumptions rather than on empirical 
recommendations. Bendor, Moe and Shot (2001) stress the aspect that Kingdon’s 
empirical reasoning in the multiple stream framework seems strong as it builds on a 
theoretical foundation, I share their view. Another criticism directed towards 
Kingdon is whether the streams can be seen independently. Kingdon highlights that 
the streams are not completely independent, but at the other hand the stream acts by 
itself until the policyentrepreneur attaches a solution to a problem in the window of 
opportunity. Mucciaroni (1992) and Bendor, Moe and Shott (2001) disagree with 
that, challenging the independence of the streams. Mucciaroni argues that viewing 
the streams interdependently brings benefits and combined the streams stimulates 
change amongst each other, I share this view. For instance if an issue receives a 
good deal of attention in the media it can influence people’s perception as reflected 
in the national mood and so influencing the politic stream. If this is the case than it 
is also most likely that the other two streams, policy and problem stream are 
affected as well.  
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2.4.1 Analytical Framework 
The overview of previous research as well as the passage of Kingdon´s multiple 
streams framework will contribute to the understanding of how policies are put on 
the agenda, but also how this affects the decision making process. My research 
question addresses to explain foreign policy stability in which Kingdon´s Multiple 
stream model will be consumed in order explore plausible explanations to the topic. 
The discussions in this thesis have lead to the creation of the following analytical 
framework: 
 
Table 4, Analytical Framework Kingdon Multiple Stream Model adapted 
by Zacharias (2003). 
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3 Methodology 
The in-depth understanding of the Swiss Veto Player structures and the Swiss 
UN Agenda-Setting process in 1986 can be reached with two case studies. The 
phenomenon will be explained with help of two different theoretical and 
analytical explanations. Both case studies analyse textual materials in order to 
get an understanding of the historical context. Finally, the methodological 
choices are discussed and their impacts on the research result 
3.1.1 The case of the Swiss Foreign Policy 
 
A case is framed as “an occurrence of a variety of different events”. A researcher 
influences the studies outcome, when selecting and placing the cases as well as 
when outlining the theoretical framework (George – Bennett, 2005:17-18). 
George and Bennett define a case as followed: We define a case as an instance 
of a class of events. The term “class of events” here refers to phenomenon of 
scientific interest (2009:17). Before explaining the methodological choices this 
chapter aims to discuss: why Switzerland´s foreign policy is of scientific interest 
and why the explanations are found within rather than outside Switzerland.  
Foreign policy is a classical topic in the studies of political science; provides 
broad researches that analyse multiple levels: as the international-, the domestic- 
and the individual level. The Swiss foreign policy is often framed as a case of 
small states, where it is compared with other small and neutral European states, 
as for example Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Finland in order to find deviant 
explanations (Goetschel, 1998). Traditional theories in foreign policy find it 
difficult to explain the Swiss foreign policy, mainly because the end of the cold 
war has made small neutral states more cooperative by joining the European 
Union. Switzerland is unique as the only European country that still holds on to 
neutrality and is rather isolated in world politics. As underlined in the theoretical 
framework, this research will search for explanatory variables in the domestic 
level. In the last decade various studies have emerged that try to explain the 
Swiss foreign policy in the aftermath of the cold war. Scholars have for instance 
framed the Swiss foreign policy as a case of “cultural identity” arguing broadly 
from a constructivist perspective about the norms of neutrality and its 
importance to identity (Goetschel, 1998, Agius-Devine, 2011, Gstöhl, 2002). 
Other scholars have framed the Swiss foreign policy as a case of “economical 
success”, arguing that the conservative policies rely on the success of the Swiss 
economy (Danthine – Lambelet, 1987:149, Widmer, 2008).  
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This research investigates the explanatory factors the veto player structures 
in the Swiss institutional setting as well as the agenda-setting process in the 
Swiss UN membership debate. The Swiss system is often described as special 
because of the combination of direct-democracy and federalism, therefore 
defining Swiss foreign policy stability as a case of veto player structures. This 
study is however designed as two case studies; therefore defining Swiss foreign 
policy as a case of agenda setting. The 1986 UN debate brought Swiss foreign 
policy on the political agenda and was the beginning of a heated debate that 
would last for decades. Swiss foreign policy is seen as an extension of these 
developments. Neither agenda-setting nor veto player structures are new ideas; 
they are prominent in the study of political science although rather rarely tested 
in the topic of foreign policy and thereby leading to a greater awareness.  
In the next chapter the research design, case study method, and the 
methodological strategy is presented and discussed. 
3.2 The Case Study Method 
“Methodological choices must take into account the characteristics of the 
phenomena we seek to understand” (Bennett – Elman, 2006:250) 
 
So, on which basis have I decided that the case-study method is a fitting method 
for understanding Swiss foreign policy stability? This research strategy provides 
a high degree of freedom when selecting the theoretical framework as well as the 
data collection methods; it helps to focus on the case and provides the possibility 
to explore variables at late stages in the research process (Stenelo, 1984:24). Yin 
defines a case study as: an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (2003:13). The overall aim of this 
research is to explain: How can the decision-making process in Swiss foreign 
policy be explained? This study investigates why since the end of the cold war 
Switzerland has not revised it´s foreign policy and thereby not adapted to the 
changes in the world. Other former European neutral states have become more 
cooperative since the end of the cold war, and still these processes are absent in 
Switzerland. Offering a puzzle in the topic of foreign policy. This thesis explores 
therefore a deviant case, the Swiss foreign policy stability does not confirm the 
predictions made in the traditional theories as realism (George – Bennett, 
2005:240).  
So the contemporary phenomenon to explain is stability in the Swiss 
Foreign Policy. How can this be explained? What if “if “ never happened would 
the Swiss foreign policy look different today, that of counterfactual reasoning 
(Esaisson et.al. 2007:101). The “if” represents here the explanation to the 
phenomena, or the context that influences the phenomena. In which context does 
the Swiss foreign policy take place? The theoretical as well as the analytical 
explanations contributes with answers. In this research the theoretical 
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explanation is a combination of “theoretical cumulation with sensitivity to 
historical context” featured by George (in Bennett, 2008:493). Theory is used as 
guidance for the case study; it directs the research question and structures the 
empirical data (Esaiasson et al. 2007:99, Yin, 1994:30). This study consumes 
theory in order to filter data; without a theoretical framework this research 
would only reinvent the wheel (see table 5). In the previous chapter I have 
discussed and presented, the Veto Player Theory (Tsebelis, 1995) and the 
Multiple Stream Framework (Kingdon, 1995). Because the Swiss foreign policy 
stability is a deviant case in the literature of foreign policy, this research aims to 
explore whether theories outside the field and therefore rather new to the topic 
can provide with additional values to the phenomenon (Bennett – Elman, 
2008:175).  
Two different theoretical frameworks are selected and outlined, in order 
to reach an in-depth understanding of the Swiss foreign policy stability; this 
study is designed as two case studies (see table 5). The purpose of this outline is 
that Switzerland’s foreign policy is a deviant case, the more cases explored the 
broader the understanding of it. But there is also the reason that the more 
theories consumed the more plausible explanations are provided. This research 
strategy is of great value when trying to explain a case, why an outcome 
happened, how it happened and why it happened in a particular time period 
(Andersen, 1997:137-138). It is important to note that this is not a classical 
multiple case study research. The classic approach would be to treat the cases as 
analytically equivalent phenomena and explain it with different theories (George 
– Bennett, 2005:19). The typical format is for example the “within-case 
comparison” (George – Bennett, 2005:V). The within case study compares the 
same unit, but differs in time and change. I could have compared the United 
Nations debate in 1986 with the UN debate in 2002 within Switzerland in order 
to explore changes over time. Allison´s “Essence of Decision” (1971) is a 
classical example of a multiple case study, analysing the phenomenon Cuban 
missile crisis from three different theoretical perspectives, or as Allison calls it 
from different “lenses” providing a general understanding of the case. This 
method would however be theory focused rather than case focused.  
The structure of this thesis, is as followed, conducting two case studies 
each of which explains one particular event in the Swiss foreign policy decision-
making process and uses further different frames of reference. Because 
Switzerland’s foreign policy is a deviant case, I argue that a different outline, 
rather than the once suggested by Allison’s or George – Bennett, combined with 
theories outside the field will uncover additional insights that would otherwise 
not have been visible in this thesis. 
This case study has further a heuristic and disciplined-configurative 
purpose (Eckstein, 1975:12). The aim is to consume rather rarely tested theories 
in the field of foreign policy, however not contributing to theory but to explain 
the phenomena (Eckstein, 1975:14).  The ambition of this research is to analyse 
the broad picture, therefore making use of a broad scope in order to analyse 
different processes in Swiss foreign policy. The two cases use different theories, 
the Veto Player theory and the Multiple Stream Framework, and have different 
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scopes; in the first case study the veto player structures in the Swiss system is 
analysed meanwhile in the second case study the UN membership agenda setting 
process. The aspect shared by both case studies is the main aim, namely to offer 
plausible explanations to the phenomena, Swiss foreign policy stability, by using 
different analytical and theoretical explanations.  
The single case study can never hit the “bull´s eye” of generalizations 
because of the n-problem, with only one case the results cannot be generalized 
(George – Bennett, 2005:32). I have eliminated these risks by conducting two 
case studies, studying two different events in the Swiss foreign policy and two 
different explanations, veto player structures and agenda-setting process. This 
research has no ambition to produce generalized research results, because the 
Swiss foreign policy is unique in relation to other European states; the aim is 
therefore to provide an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon.  
The analytical explanation is provided described as holistic inquiry 
(Eckstein, 1975:12). The ambition is to provide an in-depth understanding of the 
Swiss foreign policy stability; so a detailed data collection with multiple sources 
will offer an analytical explanation understanding the dynamics. This research 
will proceed with what is called qualitative research, as underlined by Stake: this 
research provides the ability to illuminate the particulars of human experience 
(1995:12). This research facilitates to get inside a case and gives therefore 
justice to the Swiss uniqueness (Teorell – Svensson, 2007:11). New insights 
about why the Swiss foreign policy is stabile can be provided when analysing 
the empirical data qualitatively rather than quantitatively. The quantitative 
method is no alternative here as the Swiss foreign policy is deviant, but also 
because this thesis has no ambition to generalize. This research wants to reach 
an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon provided by the qualitative 
research method.  
The analytical explanations are collected in textual material: official 
documents by the Swiss government, websites, newspapers and other relevant 
texts that contribute to the analytical explanation. The analytical method 
gathering the empirical data is the qualitative content analysis used in both case 
studies, further discussed in the next section. 
In the end of this study I will conclude the lessons learned by each case 
study and how they both combined provide an-in depth explanation on why 
Swiss foreign policy is stable (see table 5). I will also try to draw some 
comparison between the cases, I am aware that the cases differ in both theory 
and analytical data which makes the generalizations very limited. I want to 
investigate if the case comparison finds a common ground between all the 
various factors. 
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        Table 5, The Methodological Strategy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Qualitative Content analysis 
The empirical material is analysed by means of qualitative content analysis. This 
analytical tool fits the research well, as the ambition is to highlight the essence 
of the content, so careful reading the text as a whole is therefore an essential 
element in order to explore the context in which the text is incorporated 
(Esaiasson, et.al. 2007:237). So it is the overall picture that I see as valuable to 
this research, analysing the text in-depth rather than the contrary, which would 
suggest the reading of some categorized parts as provided in the quantitative 
content analysis. However, the valuable findings are sometimes hidden in the 
text and are probable not very clear at first, so the texts are closely read. 
Carefully reading the empirical material will also identify the most important 
points in the texts, the parts that are of great importance to this case. 
 How is the overall research question answered empirically? The 
theoretical framework contributes with the explanatory variables answering the 
research question; the theory represents the step of direction in the empirical 
data. The overall research question is the problem it seeks to explain; Tsebelis 
veto player theory and Kingdon´s multiple stream framework offer different 
plausible explanatory factors to the phenomenon foreign policy stability. It is 
therefore important to underline that this research is theory-based; the theoretical 
framework directs the empirical material rather than the other way round. Both 
case studies present an analytical framework, see table 3 and 4, they highlight 
the important arguments in Tsebelis’ veto player theory (see table 3) and 
Kingdon´s agenda-setting theory (see table 4). The analytical framework being 
put forward as a good starting point for the analysis and therefore not confused 
with the matter redefined approach (Esaiasson, et.al, 2007:245). This research 
follows an open approach, which is conducted in both case studies, with the 
main ambition to expose the broad picture of the phenomenon. But there is also 
something else, namely to minimize the risk of missing valuable factors, 
favouring therefore the open approach. This requires focus on the research 
question and problem; otherwise this will lead to the possibility of trivializing 
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(Esaiasson, et.al. 2007:245).  It is also of major importance that the material 
provides answers to the research question; in an open approach the conclusions 
are material dependent. In this research I´ve minimized this risk by conducting a 
pre-study in advance, in order to explore whether the accessible material is 
sufficient. 
As the discussions signal, the research choices have an impact on the 
outline of the thesis and thereby indirectly on the results. In this research I could 
have made use of the combined methodological strategy rather than the content 
analysis. This method combines content analysis, survey and interviews. 
Interviews would have provided an in-depth knowledge and contributed with a 
broader understanding of the phenomena that is not supported in the content 
analysis (Esaiasson et. al. 2007:283). However both case studies analyse a broad 
time period, many of the politicians that where active in the 1970s are most 
likely dead today and so the interviews would mostly have contributed with 
insights about the last decades, providing therefore an uneven picture. 
3.4 Material  
The study uses a broad empirical material that needs to be discussed further in 
this chapter (Yin, 1984:78-98). As earlier emphasised this research conducts two 
case studies, Veto Player structures in the Swiss Political Institutions and 
Agenda Setting in the Swiss 1986 UN debate. The selection of these cases 
depends on theoretical and analytical choices made in this research. First I will 
discuss how the first case study is empirically conducted and then how the 
second cases study is carried out.   
3.4.1 Veto Player Structures in the Swiss Political Institution 
In the first case study the theoretical frameworks are provided by Tsebelis´ veto 
player theory, the analytical explanations are offered in the debate regarding the 
Swiss Security Report. Because of Tsebelis veto player theory I define foreign 
policy stability as case of Veto Player structures. This research analyses the veto 
player structures in the Swiss political system and it’s effect on the Swiss foreign 
policy. It is valuable to this case to analyse the political system more in depth in 
order to understand how the actors within the institution act in the decision-
making process. So, how is this case study carried out empirically? 
The decision-making process regarding the Swiss Security Report 
(Schweizerischer Sicherheitsbericht) is analysed in this case study, the report is 
published once a decade by the Swiss Federal Council (executive) it outlines the 
direction of the Swiss security strategy. The document not only discusses 
military defence strategies, but further also other areas within foreign policy as 
for example international cooperation. Four reports are examined 1973, 1990, 
2000 and 2010, they further indicate the time period for this case study, where 
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I´ll analyse the reports before as well as after the end of the Cold War in order to 
examine similarities and differences between the reports. It should be expressed 
here that the Security Report 1973 is only briefly analysed, as the main ambition 
is to detect the change of direction in the Security Reports.  
Tsebelis´ veto player theory explains veto player structures in three arenas: 
executive, legislative and electoral (se table 3). The outline of the Security 
Policy Report represents the executive, in Switzerland the Federal Council 
(government) serves as a mediator for the legislative and has only restricted 
power (Linder, 2005:225). The outline of the report represents therefore the 
standpoint of the executive, as they have formulated the Security Reports. This 
research will therefore disregard from analysing the decision-making process in 
the executive (further elaborated in chapter 4).  
Main focus is on the legislative arena, as the supreme power in the Swiss 
government (Linder, 2005:197). Because of federalism the Federal Assembly 
consists of two chambers, the lower chamber the National Council and the upper 
chamber the State of Council. In this research the Swiss political system is 
analysed in-depth, this is a necessary condition in order to provide an 
understanding of the veto player structures. Analysing the outline of the Swiss 
Political system by asking questions such as: “Is the Swiss parliament built on 
majority or minority?” “What is the role of the parties in the parliament?” “How 
are the parties organised?” “What is the ideological distance among them?” “Is 
there internal cohesion?” This information is provided by the Swiss government 
website admin.ch, this is the official Swiss government website that contains 
further also the Swiss national statistics provided in the website bfs.admin.ch. In 
this case study the debate regarding the Swiss Security Report is analysed in 
each chamber separately, examining the ideological differences, as well as 
internal cohesions between veto players. The empirical material here is the 
“transcripts” that are provided by the Swiss government. These documents 
contain speeches by the actors in the National Council, as well as the State of 
Council on the topic “Swiss Security Policy report”. The protocols are found in 
the national Swiss gazette, (Bundesblatt) and in the archive on the Swiss 
parliament website, parlament.ch. A law enters in force when both chambers 
approve it, therefore of great importance to analyse the decision-making process 
on the Swiss Security Report comprehensively in the legislative arena.  
Switzerland is categorized as a so-called  “direct-democracy” (Linder, 
2005:502).  In the federal arena the people, The Swiss Federal Assembly and the 
Swiss Federal Council are all involved in the decision-making process (Linder, 
2005:243). The electoral arena has therefore to be included in the analysis; the 
people through the referendums have the power to outvote decisions in the 
legislative as well as executive arena (Art 3. BV). The outline of the Swiss 
Security Report is decided in the legislative, however goals stated in the Security 
Report as for example: international membership, the outline of the Swiss 
defence, bilateral agreements, are all goals that direct a change of direction and 
therefore by constitution require the consent of the people. In this case study 
referendums are analysed from 1973-2010, referendums that in one way or 
another direct the Swiss foreign policy. The electoral results of the referendums 
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are analysed, how the people, the parliament and the Swiss government voted in 
the referendum and if the decisions favoured the status quo or change. The 
federal office of statistics points out that since the year 1848 Switzerland has 
carried out 569 referendums (bfs.admin.ch), that makes Switzerland unique as 
no other state comes near to this amount. 
3.4.2 The 1986 UN agenda-setting process 
 
In the second case study the theoretical explanations are provided by Kingdon´s 
Multiple Stream Framework, the analytical explanation is, however, provided in 
the debate regarding a Swiss UN membership. With regard to Kingdon´s 
multiple stream frameworks defining foreign policy stability as case of agenda 
setting. Analysing the effects of the Swiss UN agenda-setting process on the 
Swiss foreign policy. The Swiss UN membership debate arose in the late 1970s 
and became later a heated debate between politicians regarding the outline of the 
Swiss foreign policy. I argue that it is essential to analyse this event more 
closely. How is this case study empirically carried out? 
 The process analysed in this case study is the UN debate, in this thesis 
referred to as the 1986 UN debate. In 1986 the Swiss population rejected the 
proposal to join the United Nations, the debate started however already in 1966 
when Geneva became United Nation´s site, which started an intense debate. It is 
important to note that Switzerland joined the United Nations at the turn of the 
millennium, it is therefore important to separate these two debates from each 
other. In this case study important actors are identified that influence the United 
Nations membership agenda setting process and contributed that the issue is put 
on the governmental agenda. During this time three important decisions took 
place, the Swiss Federal Council adopted the Swiss UN membership proposal 
the Swiss Federal Assembly decided on the Federal Council´s UN membership 
proposal and the Swiss population in a referendum decided on the membership 
in the United Nations. The UN-membership debate “ended” in 1986, even if the 
debate started again in the late 90s with a new proposal, it was the beginning of a 
heated debate between politicians and parties regarding the proposed changes in 
the Swiss foreign policy. I will, however, analyse the politics after the UN 
referendum, examining whether the same actors are political active in other 
issues as for example the European Economic Community, European Union. 
Another reason for setting the time period to 1966-1992 is to explore whether 
the end of the Cold War has had an impact on the politics and the 
policyentrepreneurs.  
Kingdon´s theory, “the multiple streams”, structures my analytical 
framework and provides with explanations. This case study analyses the 
Streams: Politic, Problem and Policy, separately in three smaller sub-studies. 
Through different approaches the streams are explained individually as well as 
combined when placing them into the multiple stream framework. A further 
ambition is to identify policyentrepreneurs as well as the window of opportunity. 
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This study aims to analyse what effect the Swiss United Nations debate had on 
the further developments in the Swiss foreign policy. The three sub-case studies 
provide the ability to identify the processes that occurred before and after the 
United Nations proposal made it on the Swiss political agenda.  
In the first stream the ambition is to highlight the political stream. The 
political stream is composed by the public mood, pressure group campaigns, 
election results, partisan and ideological distributions in the Swiss government 
and changes of administration (Kingdon, 2011:145). Newspapers, as the main 
empirical material, provide information about the politics at that time. Kingdon 
underlines that media has limited influence on the policy process; their main task 
is to report political processes (Kingdon, 2011:59). In this sub-study the 
newspapers where selected as the main empirical material as they provide an 
understanding of the historical context. This case study analyses the newspapers: 
Neue Zurcher Zeitung, Tages Anzeiger and Le Matin Dimanche, the three 
biggest daily newspapers in Switzerland. The Newspapers are representable in 
different regions and contain different political standpoints. The newspapers 
report on political events, if the three newspapers report similar about political 
events than it increases the materials objectivity. This case study searches 
articles in the Swiss Media Database (smd.ch), the database contains most Swiss 
newspapers and has archived articles that date back to the 19th century. In the 
database I search for articles that discuss the Swiss United Nations membership, 
searching further for important actors stated in the newspapers in order to 
identify the policyentrepreneurs. The process is “open”, letting theory and 
contends guide the case study, which is available in the newspapers. The time 
period is set to 1966 until 1986 in order to examine the politics before the UN 
referendum took place in 1986. The newspaper serve my research question well 
because the UN debate dates back in time it is impossible to conduct an 
interview study, it is difficult to track the key persons because of the time period. 
In the second stream, the problem stream the UN debate will be analysed 
in the executive level, namely in the Swiss Federal Council. In this sub-study 
official- and public documents, statements from press conferences, as well as 
media interviews are further analysed. Switzerland provides a well-documented 
archive, facilitating an extended data collection. Underlining, here, that the aim 
of this sub-study is to highlight the problems of the United Nations debate, as 
well as identifying the important actors, the so-called policyentrepreneurs. 
Rather than analysing the texts qualitatively, I could have conducted an 
interview study, or an observation study. Interviewing politicians about the 
problems in the UN debate. These research methods could have captured 
information that is absent in the content analysis, however tracking key actors, is 
as previously discussed problematic because of the time period. 
In the third sub study the policy stream is studied in depth, analysing the 
Swiss parliamentary debates. As explained earlier the Swiss parliament consists 
of two chambers, so the debate is examined in both chambers: the National 
Council and the Council of States. Analysing the parliamentary debate enables 
to identify different policy solutions as well as policyentrepreneurs. Using 
content analysis the protocols are examined, this material is provided in the 
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national gazette Bundesblatt, as well as on the parliamentary website 
(parlament.ch). In this pre-study I analyse the formal debate, however, an 
interview study could have outlined informal aspects and the discussions 
between parliamentarians that often take´s place outside the official meetings.  
The important assumptions in Kingdon´s model is taken into account in 
the three stub-studies, providing combined a widespread empirical material. 
Making use of the sub-studies separately as well as combined, I argue though 
that it is not before in the coupling of the three streams that the most sufficient 
factor is exposed. 
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4 Veto Player structures in the Swiss 
Political Institution 
This study examines the veto player structures in the Swiss political institution, 
explaining which impact the veto players have on the Swiss foreign policy 
decision-making process. I explore this by analysing the debate regarding the 
Swiss Security Report 1973, 1990, 2000 and 2010 in the legislative arena. 
However because of direct-democracy this thesis analyses the foreign policy 
referendums as well. 
In order to understand the Swiss veto player structures a brief presentation of 
Switzerland´s political system is presented. Followed by the results of the 
analyses in three areas: the identification of the Swiss veto players, the 
ideological and internal cohesion between the veto players and the role of the 
referendums in the Swiss foreign policy decision-making process.  
4.1 Veto Player Structures in the Swiss Political 
Institutions 
The Federal Council initiates every decade a new proposal suggesting the 
direction of the Swiss security strategy in the next following years. Ranges of 
institutional factors influence the decision-making process and thereby the 
outline of the Swiss Security Report. The Federal Assembly needs to approve 
the Security Report proposed by the Federal Council, that is a constitutional 
requirement. Because of federalism the Federal Assembly consists of two 
chambers, the National Council and the State of Council (Art 3, BV), the 
approval of both chambers are therefore required.  
The Federal Assembly is the supreme power in the Swiss federal stated 
in the constitution (Art. 148. 1 BV), the legislative is therefore responsible of a 
variety of important assignments, there are only a few parliaments holding that 
differing duties (Schmid, 1971:191ff). The legislative controls the Federal 
Council, the Federal Court and the bureaucratic administration, provides internal 
order and has the greatest foreign policy expertise (Art. 163-173 BV). The 
Federal Assembly is thereby involved in the shaping of the Swiss foreign policy 
(Art. 166.1 BV), which is rather something unusual compared to other states. 
The National Council representative’s are elected proportionally containing 200 
members; meanwhile the State of Council´s representatives are elected by the 
cantons containing 46 members (Linder, 2005:143). Similar to the American 
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“check and balances” the two chambers in the Swiss Federal Assembly are equal 
(Linder, 2005:199).  
Federalism builds on the democratic principal: “One person one vote”, 
which is applied to “One canton one vote”, all cantons are therefore equal. In the 
State of Council all cantons are equally represented this representation 
relationship favours therefore rather the small rural cantons. This creates a 
balance between the chambers; in the National Council are rather the big cantons 
favoured because of the proportional seat distribution. The State of Council 
serves its own interests, rather than the goals of the Federal Council or the 
Cantons, as for example in the German political system. An empirical study 
conducted by Wiesli and Linder (2000) showed that both chambers in the 
Federal Assembly articulate an equal quantity of federalist concerns. The 
Federal Assembly is divided into fractions and not parties (Linder, 2005:197). 
The fractions include members from the same party or from like-minded parties; 
a fraction is therefore not always the same as a party (Linder, 2005:117). The 
fractions are formed informally in the state of council.  
The Federal Assembly and the Federal Councils relationship are strongly 
characterized by cooperation (Linder, 2005:184). The legislative and the 
executive are elected separately, the former by the executives and the later by the 
people. Switzerland has a multi-party system, this is based on the Zauberformel 
(magic formula) (admin.ch). The seven members in the Federal Council are solid 
for a four-year period and there is therefore no further separation of power 
between opposition and government. The Zauberformel describes the 
constellation in the Federal Council, the seven members in the Council are 
elected in proportion to the four biggest parties. The four biggest parties have 
therefore a legislative power. The constellation of the Swiss Federal Council is 
the main reason for describing Switzerland as a consensus democracy (Lijphart, 
1984). Since 1959 the four biggest parties form the coalition government: the 
Social democratic Party (SP) with two seats, the Christian Democratic Party 
(CVP) with two seats, the Liberal Party (FDP) with two seats and the Swiss 
People´s Party (SVP) with one seat (admin.ch). The mandate period is four 
years, the latest federal election was held in 2011 (admin.ch). It should though 
be noted that this constellation has changed in the last decade as a result of the 
electoral increase of the Swiss people´s party, providing the party two seats to 
the extend of the Christian Democratic Party (admin.ch). The left-right axes can 
be described as followed: SP is placed as centre left, CVP as centrism, FDP as 
centre-right and SVP as right wing populism or nationalism conservatism. This 
categorization is not written in stone, provides however with helpful information 
about the parties in order to understand the standpoints of the parties in the 
Federal Assembly.   
Because of Switzerland’s direct-democracy all legislations are subject to 
direct electoral by the people through the referendum (Art. 140 BV). Three 
different types of referendums exist in the Swiss political system. Every 
constitutional amendment and every accession to supranational organizations 
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needs to be approved in an obligatory referendum (Art. 140:BV). Special in this 
referendum is the so-called “Doppelmehr” (double more), the people as well as 
the cantons need to adopt the referendum before implementing the policy. The 
most common referendum is the optional referendum. The people in a 
referendum can dispute any regulation adopted in the parliament, if 50´000 
unique signatures are collected within 90 days (Art. 140 BV). A general stimulus 
in the Swiss society can raise a referendum, a so-called citizen’s initiative, if 
100´000 unique signatures are collected within 18 months (Art. 140 BV). 
Especially the people´s initiative has increased enormously in the last decades, 
38 people’s initiatives where risen from 1951- 1980, while in the last decades 
1980-2013 the people have raised 108 citizen’s initiatives (bfs.admin.ch).  
4.2 Identifying the Veto Players in the Swiss 
Security Reports 
The Security Report 1973 is based on military rationales and self-representation, 
focusing on strategically goals that secure Switzerland’s autonomy 
(Sicherheitsbericht 1973).  On the 1. October 1990 the Federal Council 
presented the Swiss Security Report 1990 with the title Sicherheitspolitik im 
Wandel1 for the Federal Assembly (Sicherheitsbericht, 1990). The report 
indicated a change of direction, viewing security as multi-faceted rather than 
simply referring to military security conception as in the Security Report 1973. 
The Security Policy featured internal as well as external cooperation (ibid). The 
Security Report 90’ addressed new kinds of security challenges and suggested 
strategies that hadn´t been mentioned in the Security Report 73. The Report 90’ 
emphasised a move in direction as a respond to the changes in the international 
environment. The Report 90’ underlined a number of times the word interest, 
indicating that Switzerland had an interest in the world politics and therefore 
moving away from self-representation, as in the previous Security Report 73. 
The main argument to these increasing security interests was the youngest 
upheavals in Europe as the report expressed, making it necessary to evaluate and 
re-define the Swiss security strategy. The report discusses further also the 
difficulty of predicting future developments as a result of the changes in the 
international environment (Sicherheitsbericht, 1990). Suggesting that the unclear 
future should not encourage fearfulness or defensiveness rather animate 
fundamental objectives that contribute to a stable and safe Europe. A further 
motive presented in the report, is the goal to increase international participation, 
although highlighting its limitations because of neutrality.  
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The same tendencies where recognized in the Security Report 2000 and 
2010. The Security Report 2000 titled as Sicherheit durch Kooperation2 
addressed two main goals, an increased cooperation between civilian and 
military resources and an increased cooperation with international security 
organisations as well as neighbouring states (Sicherheitsbericht, 2000). This 
report emphasised similar arguments as the Report 90’, however pressuring 
more for international cooperation. The Security Report 2010 outlined the 
importance of a comprehensive security policy, signalling not only for 
strategically degrees in the form of defence and coping, however, also 
highlighting the importance of preventing individual forces (Sicherheitsbericht, 
2010). The report emphasises further the weight of involving all federal levels, 
addressing cooperation among all three levels: federal, cantonal and municipal 
level. This was something new; security had before primarily been a main 
federal issue.  
All Security Reports (1973,1990, 2000 and 2010) where discussed and 
decided in the chambers separately (Art, 148:BV). The National Council 
discussed the Security Report 90’ in a two-day session during the 4-5 June in 
1991. The emerging threats in Europe since the end of the cold war and the 
specification of the Army 95’ where focal points in the debate. Overall the 
National Council agreed that the report analysed the increasing problems in the 
international environment well. The Social Democratic Party argued though that 
the conclusions drawn in the Report 90’ were insufficient. The Christian 
Conservative Party claimed that the Report 90’ contained far to generalized 
arguments, therefore the report seems therefore powerless to serve as a directive 
for future security strategies. The conservative parties, SVP and FDP, in general 
favoured the report, underlining though that Swiss defence is the most important 
instrument in war prevention (Legislaturrückblick, 1987-1991:66f).  The 
National Council adopted the Report 90’ with 121:30 votes.  
Three months later, on the 24 September 1991, the State of Council 
discussed the Security Report 90’. In the State of Council politicians 
complimented the broad threat discussuion in the report. Most representatives 
expressed that the military national defence should be viewed as the most 
important instrument in the Security Policy. A minority in the State of Council 
argued that the Swiss Security Policy needed extensions in order to meet new 
threats, at the same time highlighting that the Security Report missed to point 
out solutions to these problems. As already indicated in the National Council, 
the State of Council argued that the changes in Europe have led to an increasing 
vulnerability towards new power structures. Some of the threats discussed in the 
chamber where islamic fundamentalism, nuclear prospective in the Soviet 
Union, and the civil war in East Europe. Thomas Onken (SP), was the only actor 
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emphasising a different direction, arguing that future threats as armed conflicts 
in Europe are a possibility but having no direct impact on Switzerland. The State 
of Council adopted the Security Report 90´with 24:5 votes. 
In the National Council and the State of Council the discussions about 
the Report 2000 and 2010 contained similar arguments as emphasised in the 
Report 90. SP politicians emphasising international cooperation and arguing that 
the reports should address concrete examples about how to increase international 
cooperation. Meanwhile SVP and FDP politicians emphasised the national 
defence as the centrepiece and argued that the reports should underline this more 
in-depth. CVP politicians highlighted both international cooperation as well as 
national defence, argued that the key of a successfully security strategy is the 
combination of both. The Security Report 2000 and 2010 where adopted by both 
chambers, the National Council as well as the State of Council. 
Table 5, describes the seat distributions in the Federal Assembly from 
1971-2007, the years represent the mandate elections and so highlighting the 
seat distribution between the four biggest parties in the National Council and the 
State of Council. The absorption rule has no relevancy in this case because the 
party majority differs between the National Council and the State of Council, see 
table 5. Identifying the National Council and the State of Council as two 
institutional Veto Players, as they both have to agree to the proposed change. 
The seat distributions have been stabile in the State of Council over time; CVP 
and FDP having the seat majority (see table 5). Meanwhile interesting are the 
changes in the National Council (see table 5). In 1971 the parties SP, FDP, CVP 
together shared the majority, meanwhile SVP was the smallest party holding the 
least seats. Noteworthy is how SVP occupies in 1971 23 seats, meanwhile in 
1999 nearly doubling it to 44 in 1999 and in 2007 becoming the biggest party 
inhabiting 62 seats in the National Council. Meanwhile, CVP and FDP lose seats 
in the National Council over time (left table) and so becoming the smallest 
parties in the chamber. 
 
Table 6, Federal Assembly seat distribution at the time of the Security Report 
decisions in the legislative 
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The Security Report 90 addressed the importance of collaborating with the 
European Union in order to contribute to a safe and stabile Europe. Although the 
Report 90 was adopted by the Federal Assembly, a European Union membership 
can not only be implemented by the Federal Council without a obligatory 
referendum, required by constitution the consent by the people and the cantons 
(Art. BV:140). Therefore I identify the people as the third institutional Veto 
Player, they have to agree to the proposed change. This means that the National 
Council, the State of Council and the people through the referendum all are 
institutional Veto Players; they are all collective actors and have to agree to a 
change as proposed by Tsebelis’.  
Tsebelis underlines that the majority party in most political systems 
founding the government can possess veto power the so-called partisan Veto 
Player. However because four parties, a multi-party government found the 
Federal Council and therefore share majority. The parties on their own have no 
power to implement change; this means that their vote is not a requirement in 
order to adopt a policy the parties are however embedded in the National 
Council and the State of Council.  
In the next chapter the complex relationship between the three 
institutional Veto Players will be discussed. 
4.3 Internal Cohesion and Ideological distance 
between the Veto Players in the Swiss Security 
Report 
The ideological distance among the veto players have a sufficient influence on 
the policy outcome, the greater the distance among the veto players the more 
difficult to reach consent and thereby favouring the status quo (Tsebelis, 
2002:30). In this research I have identified the ideological distance among the 
veto players as great.  
In the State of Council CVP possesses the most seats at the same being a 
typically centre party they balance power between the parties and have therefore 
an advantage in the decision-making process. In the debate about the Security 
Report 1990, 2000 and 2010 it becomes clear that CVP encourages a modern 
defence as well as a participation in a European Security alliance although 
without risking neutrality (Bundesblatt, VIII:7666). Suggesting that the defence 
adapts to the new security threats. Meanwhile, FDP being the second biggest 
party in the State of Council focuses mainly on the defence (ibid). As 
highlighted by CVP a defence that can meet the increasing challenges in Europe 
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at the same time the party supports international cooperation, however not being 
the most active actor in the debate. SVP on the other side is the actor waving for 
an independent and neutral Switzerland (Bundesblatt, III:8). They are against an 
international cooperation arguing that it risks neutrality at the same time as FDP 
laying a lot weight on the defence, especially on air force arguing that it is the 
core of national defence and emphasising self-representation. Even though FDP, 
CVP and SVP don’t share the same political standpoints in the debate about the 
Security Report 1990, 2000 and 2010 they still are closest ideologically. SP on 
the other side differs ideologically the most from SVP.  The party is in general 
against the defence, arguing that the defence is far too costly and serves no clear 
strategy (Bundesblatt, III:10). The outline of the defence today is an inefficient 
tradition in Switzerland and cannot meet the increasing challenges in Europe. SP 
is further the party that the strongest emphasises international cooperation, 
suggesting a closer involvement with the OSCE, the UN and the EU.  
The views differ between the parties, however as table 5 indicates, SP 
and SVP have rather little to say in the State of Council. CVP and FDP on the 
other side have historically seized most power in the decision-making process, 
especially in the State of Council. The State of Council favours in general the 
middle way, and thereby balancing between international cooperation and the 
role of the defence. In the National Council, because of the changes in seat 
distribution in the last decades the powers between the parties have varied. SVP 
had only little power in the decision-making process because it possessed the 
least seats. During the last decades this has however changed because it’s 
success in the electoral in the last decades. 
The two biggest parties Christian Democratic Party (CVP) and Liberal Party 
(FDP) are both located rather in the middle of the left-right axes, favouring 
therefore consensus. Internal cohesion was therefore rather small in the Federal 
Assembly regarding the Swiss security report.  
4.4 The Referendum as the ultimate Veto Player 
As Table 7 indicates, Switzerland has during the time period 1986-2010 had 18 
Referendums that in one way or another raised a decision that is linked to the 
Swiss Security Policy Report, 1990, 2000 and 2010. As pointed out in the 
previous chapter all three reports where adopted by the institutional Veto Players 
the National Council and the State of council.  
 
Table 7, Swiss Foreign Policy referendums from 1986-2010 
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The referendum, because of direct-democracy, moved the decision–making 
process from the executive and the legislative to the electoral. When analysing 
the referendums in-depth it became evident that the Swiss People voted in 
favour of the status quo in 13 referendums of total 18 referendums. Once 
debated and adopted in the legislative the proposal once again is put out there 
through a referendum. The final decision is therefore in the hands of the 
institutional veto player the people; this veto player is far more unpredictable 
than the other two, National Council and the State of Council. As table 8 
indicates, a referendum is either raised by the Federal Council, in an obligatory 
referendum, or by interest groups, people´s initiative. The interest groups 
possess the ability to raise a referendum because of two reasons, because of a 
broad network they can collect signatures and because of organizational 
resources they can launch campaigns. Even though the Federal Council and the 
interest groups have the ability to raise a referendum, as table 8 indicates, it 
doesn´t mean that they also take control over the referendum. Policy decisions 
moving to the electoral level can favour small parties, that in the legislative are 
in minority have an ability to mobilize voters and become therefore influential in 
the electoral. 
 
Table 8, a slection of Foreign Policy Referendums from 1986-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This became visible when analysing referendum’s regarding organizational 
membership as for example UN membership, EEC membership or EU 
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membership. In all these referendums the Federal Council launched the 
obligatory referendum, however it was the Swiss People´s party that mobilised 
extensive campaigns against the referendum’s and exerting thereby political 
influence. Mobilizing campaigns gave the SVP the ability to influence the 
decision-making process in the electoral. The actor triggering the referendum 
was in all these cases not the same as the one taking control over it. The analysis 
indicated that referendums directing a change failed in most cases in the 
electoral. SVP mobilised successful campaigns against the referendums however 
being in the opposition in the Federal Assembly. This indicates that the parties 
favouring status quo also profit in national electoral. During 1986-2010 six 
referendums where raised regarding an international membership: two 
referendums regarding an European Union membership, one referendum 
regarding an European Economic Cooperation membership and two 
referendums regarding a United Nations membership. SVP is against all these 
international memberships and lead five successful campaigns against the 
referendums, lost however the last one regarding the Swiss UN entry in 2002, 
which was adopted by the people in the referendum. The referendums were 
launched during the time period 1986-2010 (see table 8), during this time SVP 
increased it´s votes immensely especially in the federal election in 2007 the 
party recorded historically the highest votes of a single party in Switzerland with 
28.9% of the votes (bfs.admin.ch). In the federal elections in 1987 they had only 
reeceived 11% of the votes and where back than still the smallest party 
(bfs.admin.ch), however progressively increasing votes over time. It should be 
noted that historically never before had so many referendums regarding a 
membership in international organizations been launched as in the time period 
1986-2002. This might indicate that there is a causal relationship between 
international organization referendums and the increasing votes of SVP. 
However in order to test this empirically a quantitative study is more fitted. 
Another interesting indication is that half of the referendums on the topic 
foreign policy addressed in one way or another military matters. When analysing 
the Security Report 1990, 2000 and 2010 it became clear that CVP, FDP and 
SVP shared similar ideological standpoints, namely that the national defence is 
the most important actor in the Swiss Security Policy. Five referendums where 
launched by the Federal Council, with the aim of strengthening the national 
defence, all referendums where adopted by the people (see table 7). The other 
four referendums addressing the national defence where launched by interest 
groups, some of the referendums announced extreme measurements as for 
example eliminating the Swiss national defence completely, as in the people´s 
initiative “Switzerland without an army” in 1989. The only party favouring these 
referendums was SP, however all referendums where rejected in the electoral. 
Once again the people trough the referendum favoured the status quo.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This case study aimed to answer the following research question: What plausible 
explanations can Tsebelis Veto Player Theory contribute with in the Swiss 
Federal Assembly debate regarding the Swiss Security Report, 1973, 1990, 
2000, 2010? 
A proposed change in Switzerland´s foreign policy can be adopted if 
three institutional veto players give their consent, namely the two chambers in 
the Federal Assembly and the people through the referendum. As the Swiss veto 
player structures indicate, one could assume that problems would already arise 
in the legislative arena namely in the Federal Assembly. That the Swiss veto 
player structures offer hurdles in the legislative arena, as both chambers are 
identified as collective veto players. The chambers consist of multiple fractions, 
differing ideologically and thereby increasing the probability of internal 
cohesion, making it therefore difficult to reach consensus within as well as 
between the chambers. This was however never the case in this study, the 
National Council as well as the State of Council decided in favour of change in 
all Security Reports.  
This indicates that the commitment of the government towards a policy 
change in the Swiss policy report was high. At the same time the advocates for a 
change of direction in the Security report had managed to mobilize support in 
the legislative, as all reports successfully were adopted. The domestic factors 
support and commitment contributed to consensus in the Swiss government. 
However, the most important factor influencing the outcome in the Swiss 
security report is the people. In order to implement the proposed changes in the 
Security report the consent of the people through referendums is required. One 
could assume here that because the people elect the politicians in the National 
Council the people would therefore also vote in line with the suggestions 
highlighted by the government. This did however not occur; the people favoured 
the status quo as the analyses of the referendums reveal and because the final 
decision is at the electoral level, the majority of the new proposed directions 
emphasised in the three latest Security reports (1990, 2000 and 2010) were not 
realized.  
This indicates that because of the Swiss veto structures it is of great 
importance to mobilize support within the government as well as outside. The 
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counterfactual reasoning can be summarized as followed: Switzerland contains 
of three veto players, because the people through the referendum the advocates 
had successfully mobilized support in the government had however not managed 
to mobilize the Swiss society in the referendums, therefore causing no change of 
direction in the Swiss foreign policy as suggested in the Swiss security report 
(1990, 2000 and 2010). The mobilization of the people was though successfully 
lead by the opposition, the Swiss people’s party. Being the smallest party in the 
Federal Council in the late 1980s, however over time increasing it´s votes 
progressively (see table 6) and so becoming the biggest party in Switzerland at 
the federal election in 2007. Whether the success primary is linked to the 
successful campaigning in referendums cannot alone be answered in this case 
study. 
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5 The UN Agenda-Setting Process 
In this chapter I analyse how individual decision-makers try to push their ideas 
through the decision-making process. As stated in the case study veto player 
structures in the Swiss political system, the actors, rules and practices will vary 
with regard to the outline of the political system. With help of Kingdon´s 
multiple stream framework the problems, the politics and the policies are first 
analysed separately and later viewed together when viewing them combined 
identifying the “window of opportunity” as well the “policyentrepreneurs”. 
5.1 The Problem Stream 
The problems in the Swiss foreign policy, especially the risk of increasing 
isolation and exclusion in the international arena, occurred in the late 1960s 
when the first advocates for a United Nations membership emerged after nearly 
50 years of silence. Policymakers drew their main attention on the United 
Nations and emphasising the political importance of joining this international 
institution. 
Switzerland has historically favoured rather peace friendly security 
strategies, which became evident in the year 1815 when Switzerland at the 
Vienna Congress adopted neutrality permanently. The Vienna Congress served 
at that time as an international organisation. Neutrality did not only secure 
Switzerland´s autonomy, it was at that time an attempt to contribute to peace in a 
time when Europe struggled with a variety of conflicts. The Swiss politicians 
agree that neutrality served Switzerland well during the World War I and World 
War II and must therefore be viewed as a successful security strategy 
(Bundesblatt, 1981:497). However, since the end of World War II a variety of 
international organisations have emerged and as table 9 indicates Switzerland 
joined seven international organizations before the UN debate heated off.  
 
Table 9, selection of Landmarks in the Swiss Foreign Policy  
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In the late 1960s until the early 1970s, actors inside as well as outside the 
Swiss government became alarmed that Switzerland would become more and 
more excluded in the international arena, two main events contributed two this 
apprehension. First, in 1966 the UN established some of its organizations in 
Geneva as for example FAO, UNHCR and UNAIDS, actors underlined that if 
Switzerland could act as a host for UN organisations than there where no 
political incitements of not becoming a member (BBI, 1984:I:176) . Arguing 
further also that Switzerland as a non-member still contributes with a large sum 
in form of economical funds up to hundred million francs. Second, in 1973 the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic became 
members in the UN, after decades being an active observer in the UN together 
with Switzerland. Swiss politicians where concerned that the role of the observer 
would diminish leaving Switzerland only one choice either to join or to be left 
on the outside (BBI, 1984:I:177). The actors underlining this problem were 
mostly people from the Swiss Social Democratic Party (SP). Attention was 
centred on Switzerland responsibility to contribute to solidarity and universality 
towards other states in the world community (Motion Tanner-Zurich, 1973:640). 
Even though the UN under decades had been criticised for being a lose forum 
without any actual power the defenders argued that the UN today is the only 
international organisation that expresses the ultimate goal to secure world peace 
and international security (Motion Tanner-Zurich, 1973:640). Most observers 
felt that, with international cooperation the future threats could be met and even 
suggesting rethinking or even revising neutrality. Because new “peace” 
institutions had emerged Switzerland´s neutrality would lead to exclusion rather 
than contributing to peace in the world community (ibid).   
The Federal Council´s proposal from 1981 regarding the Swiss UN 
membership highlights that the ultimate goal in the Swiss foreign policy is the 
existence of Switzerland as an autonomous state and as an equal member in the 
world community (Bundesblatt, 1981:498). The Swiss permanent neutrality 
together with solidarity towards the international community is argued by the 
Federal Council to be the most important means in order to achieve these 
perceptions (ibid). The Federal Council stresses further that the attempt to join 
the UN is an important step towards normality, alliance as well as an extensive 
of the Swiss relations with the United Nations (ibid). The Federal Council 
underlined that the UN today differs remarkable from 1945 when it first was 
established, back than founded by the great powers in order to force world peace 
(ibid). However, during the Cold War the UN has made clear that military 
measurements are not used in order to obtain world peace and has during the last 
decades proven to be an essential world forum for international cooperation. 
In order to summarize the political stream the events UN site in Geneva and 
the UN memberships of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German 
Democratic Republic, gave rise to discussions about a UN membership in the 
late 1970s. 
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5.2 The Political Stream 
The second stream and as Kingdon underlines the most prominent stream is the 
political stream. On the 14 December in 1984 the Federal Assembly approved 
the Federal Council´s proposal to join the UN. However, the Swiss membership 
in the UN requires by constitution a referendum, the people and the cantons need 
to approve the membership with a so called double-more (Doppelmehr). The 
cantons and the people rejected the UN referendum on the 16 March 1986 (see 
table 10).  
  
Table 10, UN referendum election result. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scientists argue that it was hard to predict the outcome of the UN referendum 
until the day of election, the policy process had taken nearly 20 years and during 
the process a variety of hurdles had been accomplished (Linder, 2005 et al). The 
UN membership-issue made it on the governmental agenda in 1966 however the 
decision agenda was not concluded until 1986 when the people and the cantons 
rejected an UN membership  (Bundesblatt, I 1966:1449).  
One prominent feature in the political stream was the election of Social 
Democratic politicians as foreign ministers during the period 1966-1987. In 
1966 Willy Spühler became foreign minister, it was the first time a 
representative of the Social Democratic Party held this position (admin.ch). The 
Swiss Democratic Party had always favoured international cooperation and 
made it prominent during their election campaigns. With Spühler as foreign 
minister they now had a passionate representative in the Federal Council. 
Spühler was the starting point of nearly two decades of Social Democratic 
Foreign ministers, with successor as Pierre Graber from 1970-1978 and Pierre 
Aubert from 1978-1987 (admin.ch). The combination of the problem stream and 
the political stream where enough to put UN membership on the governmental 
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agenda. If Spühler made an important contribution, namely that UN became an 
issue, Aubert on the other side made it a high-prioritized issue in the legislature 
period 1979-1983 (Bundesblatt, 1977:813). In 1981 the Federal Council agreed 
to join the UN, however waited nearly three years before forwarding it to the 
decision agenda, where the Federal Assembly decided on the proposal in 1984 
where the proposal was adopted by both chambers. Aubert had thereby 
successfully contributed to the adoption of the UN proposal in both the 
executive and legislative level, however the last hurdle remained, the people and 
the cantons had to agree therefore the final decision remained (Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung, 821230, 820323). Aubert being one of the main advocates led the pro-
side in the UN campaign, however as already pointed out this referendum failed 
enormously (see table 10).  
The other prominent feature in the political stream was the formation of the 
action committee against an UN membership (AUNS), this committee started as 
a lose coalition between Otto Fischer and Christoph Blocher in the early 1980s. 
Otto Fischer was member of the Liberal Party (FDP), representative in the 
National Council during the late 1970s until the early 1980s, and director of the 
Swiss Trade Association (Tages Anzeiger, 830113). Christoph Blocher 
represented the Swiss Peoples Party (SVP) in the National Council from the 
1980s until present, was member in the Federal Council from 2004-2007 and is a 
successful industrialist owning a chemical corporation (Tages Anzeiger, 
830113). Fischer and Blocher started in the early 1980s to spread their ideas 
however they had only little success in the governmental arena. In 1983 Blocher 
claimed that the Swiss People´s Party would present a new party program, 
emphasising that SVP will highlight problems that no other party addresses 
(Tages Anzeiger, 830113). Neutrality became the most prominent feature in 
their campaign emphasising that Swiss neutrality would vanish when joining the 
UN. The majority of Swiss governmental parties saw no conflict between 
neutrality and UN membership, further elaborated in the policy stream. In 1982 
Fischer and Blocher criticised the Federal Council for using tax money in the 
UN campaign, they argued that the government thereby favoured only one side 
in the UN debate. However Fischer-Blocher got only little attention for these 
assumptions (Glur, 1999:74-85). The Federal Council responded quickly against 
this accusation, as a result the Department for Foreign Affairs used only half of 
its budget in the UN campaign (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 870505). Interesting to 
note is therefore here, that the Blocher-Fischer coalition already in the beginning 
of the 1980s mobilised the contra-side of the UN membership, meanwhile the 
pro-side didn´t start to organise their campaign until 1985. Blocher and Fischer 
were important actors in the decision agenda, having no political power in the 
governmental agenda, as the policy stream indicates, however leading a 
successful campaign in the UN referendum. Their success must consort together 
with campaign advertisements (Tages Anzeiger, 831209). The campaign for “a 
neutral and autonomous Switzerland” (AUNS) used advertisements in the 
Newspapers to distribute their ideas to the voters, alone in the Neue Zurcher 
Zeitung from 1982-1986 180 advertisements where found. As an article in the 
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Tages Anzeiger further emphasises the Swiss People´s party spend over one 
million Swiss francs in party advertisements (Tages Anzeiger, 831209). Maybe 
it was strategically of Fischer and Blocher to blame the Federal Council of using 
tax money in their campaign. As earlier underlined the Federal Council 
responded by using only half of its resources, more would have been necessary 
in order to become a serious contender against the Blocher-Fischer coalition. But 
also to inform the people about to which extent an UN entry affects neutrality. 
When analysing the newspapers only few articles addressed the relationship 
between neutrality and the UN. Even though the majority of the articles favoured 
the UN membership most of them emphasised the importance of solidarity 
towards other international organizations and that it is Switzerland´s 
responsibility to contribute to world peace (Tages Anzeiger, 840316, Neue 
Zurcher Zeitung 820323) 
The majority of the articles in the newspapers favoured an UN membership. 
The Neue Zurcher Zeitung published the most articles on the topic meanwhile 
the Tages Anzeiger only presented a few articles, therefore the picture is not 
equivalent between the newspapers. It was difficult to locate any mood swings, 
from the period 1980-1986 the arguments for an UN membership where the 
same as well as the contra arguments. Because the articles overall had a positive 
attitude towards the UN, the national mood is identified as favouring the UN. An 
“antigovernmental mood” was identified in the newspapers even though it was 
rather a small amount of articles. As for example the article “Neutrality and UN 
entry” underlines: 
 
Es ist unmöglich, sich vorzustellen, dass die Schweiz als UNO Mitglied immer 
noch an der Neutralität festhalten könnte  (Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 810514)3 
 
Or as the article “Self-assertion without an UN membership” highlights: 
 
Die Schweiz hat auch ohne eine UNO Mitgliedschaft ihre Politischen als auch 
Ökonomischen Interessen verfolgen können. Die schweizerische politische, 
ökonomische und soziale Stabilität ist sehr geschätzt bei anderen Staaten4. (Neue 
Zurcher Zeitung, 860306).  
 
Similar to Blocher and Fischer the articles against an UN entry used neutrality as 
the main contra-argument. The result of the election was not consistent with the 
result of the newspaper analyses, indicating therefore that there are other reasons 
for the outcome. As the political stream indicates two processes contributed to 
this outcome, the advertisements mobilized by the Blocher-Fischer campaign 
                                                                                                                                       
 
3 It is impossible to imagine that Switzerland as an UN member still could hold on to neutrality 
4 Switzerland has also without an UN membership maintained it´s world political interests as well as 
economical interests. Switzerland’s political, economical and social stability is extremely appreciated 
by other countries 
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together with the lack of information about neutrality and an UN membership 
had an impact on the voters favouring the status quo. 
To summarize the political stream, the change of minister in the Department 
of Foreign Affairs had a great impact on the governmental agenda. Pierre Aubert 
as a member of the Social democratic party (SP) favoured an active foreign 
policy. He contributed to the success in the legislative and the executive level, 
failed however immensely in the electoral level. The Blocher-Fischer coalition 
on the other side had little to say in the legislative, executive level could 
however use the contra arguments in the electoral level by mobilising campaigns 
in the early 1980s. This gave them a remarkable advantage in the election. 
Further I can draw the assumption that the successful actors in the governmental 
agenda and the decision agenda differ.   
5.3 The Policy Stream 
Kingdon underlines the importance of softening the policy system, reaching 
consensus, before the window of opportunity opens (Kingdon, 2005:236). Without 
any loose agreements the advocates will not be able to take any advantage when the 
window opens leading to the outcome “no change” when the window closes (ibid).  
 A similar outcome happened in the UN membership initiative in 1986. 
Shortly after Aubert had become Swiss Foreign minister the UN membership had 
become a high-prioritized issue in the Federal Council making it on the 
governmental agenda. However the goal was to pass it further to the decision 
agenda in the early 1980s, in reality the UN membership was not decided before 
1984 in the legislative. 
 
Table 11, Summary of pro- and contra arguments in the UN debate 
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It should though be underlined here that advocates presented different 
reasons for joining the UN in the Federal Assembly. Some advocates underlined 
the obligation to contribute to world peace, other named economical reasons, 
others solidarity and universality towards the World Community (se table 10). 
Despite the different reasons for joining the UN, Pierre Aubert, Foreign minister 
and the actor in charge in the UN debate had managed to build consensus among 
politicians. The majority of the Swiss parliamentarians favoured an UN 
membership. Because of federalism both chambers in the Federal Assembly had 
to decide on the issue. On the 15 March in 1984 the Federal Council´s proposal 
to join the UN was decided in the National Council. Bernard Dupont (FDP) 
argues that the UN has changed since 1945 and that all major issues today go 
trough this international institution that makes the UN an important institution. 
As underlined: 
 
L'ONU de 1984 n'est pas celle de 1945. Elle est devenue universelle, par sa 
composition et par les tâches qui lui sont confiées. Qu'elles soient 
économiques, sociales, juridiques, culturelles, humanitaires, toutes les grandes 
questions de notre temps passent par l'ONU. Dans toute la coopération 
internationale, le rôle de l'ONU est de plus en plus important (BBI, 1984 : 
I :217)5. 
 
Nearly all advocates in the National Council underlined the importance of 
solidarity towards the world community and the increasing interdependence 
between world states naturally leading to an UN membership (BBI, 1984:I:214). 
Other advocates argued that Switzerland already contributed economically to the 
UN, however as a non-member they had no impact on how to make use of the 
money arguing it is therefore rationally to join the organization (ibid). As the 
problem stream underlines many advocates argued that it was time to act as the 
membership of the DDR and BRD had made the role of the observer irrelevant 
(BBI:1984:I:227). Neutrality, however, was the main argument against an UN 
entry and Aubert together with other advocates tried to emphasise that neutrality 
was not harmed with an UN entry. Walter Renschler (SP) argues that 
Switzerland has to prove its neutral position within the UN rather than outside 
the UN (BBI:I:213). As Aubert (SPS) further underlines in the National Council 
discussion:  
 
 Neutralité ne signifie ni absence de politique extérieure ni obligation de se 
taire (BBI, 1984:I :219)6 
 
However the contra side was a small minority, with Christoph Blocher (SVP) as 
the main opponent against an UN membership argued that the Swiss government 
sacrifices its neutrality with an entry (BBI: 1984:I:218). As underlined: 
 
 Neutralität ist nicht eine rechtliche Konstruktion ausgeformt bei Bürokraten 
                                                                                                                                       
 
5 The UN has changed since 1945, all major issues today go trough this international institution, that 
makes the UN a very, very important institution 
6 Neutrality means not the absence of a foreign policy or the obligation to remain silent 
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sondern eine notwendige Sicherheitsstrategie die bis heute der Schweiz 
erfolgreich dient 7(BBI: 1984:I:218).  
 
Blocher argues further that an UN membership does not only risk neutrality it 
risks a strategy that historically has been successfully, a binding UN contract 
will lead to an unclear future (ibid). The contra arguments made by Blocher and 
other opponents had however no penetrative power, they did lose the election in 
the National Council, the UN proposal was adopted with 102:58 votes 
(BBI:1984:I:229) 
The State of Council decided on the Federal Council´s proposal to join the 
UN on the 12 December in 1984. It should be highlighted here that the same 
arguments where emphasised by advocates as in the National Council. For 
instant Franz Muheim (CVP) representing the pro-side in the UN debate in the 
State of Council underlines: 
 
Die schweizerische Mitgliedschaft in der UNO ist ein natürlicher Weg unserer 
Sicherheitspolitik, deshalb ein Akt unserer Politik. Die schweizerische 
Sicherheitspolitik beinhaltet die gleichen Visionen wie unser Staat, einen 
größeren Zweck außerhalb unserer Existenz, statt alleine zu handeln 
(BBI:1984:V:718).8  
 
Further arguing that Switzerland needs to realize that Switzerland is a small 
state in the World Community, to act on its own is in long run no option (ibid). 
In the State of Council the opinion of the Swiss people was discussed, however 
Muheim underlined that the politicians have been elected because they know 
best about the states interest and that a decision has to be taken by politicians 
without the influence of public opinion (ibid). Max Affolter (FDP) on the other 
side represented the small contra-side in the State of Council. Affolter did not 
share the argument made by Muheim, emphasising the importance of involving 
the people in the process, making the arguments presentable for them so that the 
people can understand which impact an UN membership has on Neutrality 
(BBI:V:722).  The value of understanding that the Swiss foreign policy has a 
traditional value for the people and therefore cannot just be decided without 
elaborating it in-depth (ibid). Affolter never directly said he was against an UN 
entry, however argued that the Swiss politicians made this topic far to easy. 
Further arguing that the Swiss people see the Swiss foreign policy from a 
different perspective and in order to persuade them the arguments for an UN 
entry have to be clearer (ibid). As in the National Council the State of Council 
adopted the Federal Council´s proposal to join the UN with 24:17 Votes 
(BBI:1984:V:739).   
                                                                                                                                       
 
7 Neutrality is not a legal construction made by some bureaucrats but rather an essential security 
strategy that until today serves Switzerland well 
8 Switzerland´s entry into the UN is a natural move of our foreign policy, and as such an act of our 
governmental policy. The foreign policy holds the same drive as the state namely to have a greater 
purpose outside its existence rather than act on its own 
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How could Pierre Aubert build the consensus in the Federal Assembly? It 
took nearly four years before the issue, UN membership, was transferred from 
the Governmental Agenda to the Decision Agenda. This enabled Aubert to hold 
several meetings and publications in order to create loose agreements and giving 
him time in order to find the right moment to launch the issue to the decision 
agenda. Another contributor to the consensus building was that in 1948, when 
Switzerland the last time had discussed an UN membership, the UN had no 
understanding for Switzerland´s neutrality. However, during the last decades UN 
had proven to be an important forum where states could discuss world problems 
and thereby the UN was no longer a peace-forcer, which fitted with the idea of 
Swiss Neutrality. As an SP politician, the party historically favouring 
international organization, managed to get the majority of CVP and FDP by 
convincing the two biggest parties at the time. The two parties encouraged an 
active foreign policy as long Switzerland could hold on to neutrality.  
Pierre Aubert and his predecessors had managed to build consensus, the 
majority of the parliamentarian’s favoured UN membership however time was 
an important factor contributing to the success. Forwarding the UN membership 
from the government agenda to the decision agenda. In most other political 
systems the UN policy would have been implemented, however because of 
direct-democracy and because the UN membership was an issue of international 
membership an obligatory referendum was required by constitution. As the 
political stream indicates the UN membership was rejected by the people as well 
as the cantons in a so-called double-more (see table 9).  
5.4 The UN “window” and the policyentrepreneurs 
As underlined earlier there are two types of political agendas, the governmental 
agenda and the decision agenda (Kingdon, 2005:242). In this case study the 
differences of the two agendas was highlighted in the political stream. Events in 
the problem stream and political stream assured that the UN membership 
became a prominent issue on the governmental agenda, however because the 
influential actors differed in the two agendas it must be assumed that the window 
had closed before the referendum was held in 1986.  
 The advocates had to take advantage of the confluence of the three 
streams, or their chance would be gone. The Federal Council, and especially the 
Swiss Social democrats with help of their foreign minister Aubert, knew that 
they had an opportunity to push their ideas in the late 1970s was put on the 
governmental agenda.  However they knew that waiting with pushing the issue 
into the decision agenda would pay off. Waiting would give them better 
opportunities in the legislative arena, pushing to early and their chance would be 
lost for decades. The Federal Council waited therefore from 1981, proposal 
established, until the year 1984 before letting the National Council and the State 
of Council decide on the UN proposal. As the policy stream indicates both 
chambers in the Swiss Federal Assembly adopted the proposal. However maybe 
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the advocates had focused too much on the first part of the decision-making 
process and thereby missed the window of opportunity, because in 1986 the 
window was most certain closed. The UN proposal had no chance of success in 
the referendum as table 9 indicates. During the whole policy process the 
advocates had forgotten to take control over the electoral level, therefore only 
controlling one part of the decision agenda. Aubert could on the 14 March in 
1986 not couple the three streams together and missed therefore his window of 
opportunity. Blocher-Fischer on the other side had taken control over the 
decision agenda, which gave them the opportunity to realize their ideas. 
Pierre Aubert became a policyentrepreneur, as a SP politicians and Foreign 
minister he had the right authoritative policy position in the UN debate. Making 
great use of the politic and problem stream so that the issue made it on the 
governmental agenda. However another important policyentrepreneur was 
identified Christoph Blocher, a real underdog in the political arena and new in 
the politics however he had a great ability to speak for his interests and was 
persistent with his ideas. Together with Otto Fischer they had a great network 
outside the political arena because of their success as industrialists and had 
therefore the contacts and the funds to create an enormous anti-UN campaign. 
We see here how important it is that the policyentrepreneur is active in all three 
streams in order to couple the streams together and create a change, in the UN 
case however the entrepreneurs differed which gave Blocher-Fischer the 
advantage in the referendum.  
People inside as well as outside the Swiss government claimed that the 
rejection of the UN membership in 1986 through the UN referendum was a 
major step backwards in the Swiss foreign policy. Others argued it was the right 
decision to take. Regardless what the policy-makers had decided the people had 
the last say.  
A particular relevance to this case is that in the European Economic 
Cooperation referendum held in 1992 Christoph Blocher was highly engaged in 
the electoral level, mobilizing an extensive campaign against it, favouring once 
more the status quo (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 920822, Tages Anzeiger, 921106, 
921118). Even this referendum was rejected even though the government had 
recommended it (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 930510, 930514) 
5.5 Conclusion 
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This case study aimed to answer the following research question: What plausible 
explanations can Kingdon´s Multiple Stream Framework contribute with in the 
1986 UN debate? 
A proposed change in Switzerland´s foreign policy can occur if the 
policyentrepreneur manage to couple the three streams policy, politic and 
problem in the window of opportunity. The coupling of the three streams is not 
that simple. The analyses of the problem stream indicated that two main events 
influenced the agenda setting process, namely the establishment of the UN site 
in Geneva in 1966 and the UN membership of the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the German Democratic Republic in 1973, both events opening the road to 
UN membership discussions. This requires however that advocators make use of 
these events by proposing solutions to these problems. In 1966 Willy Spühler, 
for the first time ever a social democratic politician, was elected as Swiss foreign 
minister. This was the starting point of nearly three decades of social democratic 
foreign ministers, with successor as Pierre Graber and Pierre Aubert. The social 
democrats had always favoured a change of direction in the Swiss foreign 
policy, having their party member as foreign minister gave them the prime 
opportunity to mobilize a change. The UN membership became a prominent 
issue in the governmental agenda especially with the help of Willy Spühler and 
Pierre Aubert, however taking nearly four years before the issue was forwarded 
to the decision agenda. Whether it was a strategically move from the advocators 
to wait so long or if the issue just didn’t had any space in the decision agenda 
could not be identified in this case study. However, Pierre Aubert had managed 
to successfully mobilize support in the legislative as the UN proposal was 
adopted in the legislative. This indicates that the commitment of the government 
towards a policy change in the UN policy was high. The analyses indicate that 
the opposition, with the main actors Christoph Blocher and Otto Fischer, had no 
influence in the decision-making process in the legislative arena. However, 
because the UN membership proposal falls under a so-called obligatory 
referendum, requires therefore by constitution the consent of the people and the 
cantons. The referendum was held in 1986. As the result of the analyses indicate 
Aubert had successfully mobilized success in the government had however 
failed enormously at the electoral level, the cantons as well as the people 
rejected the referendum with clear percentages. So this indicates that the window 
of opportunity had already closed in 1986. The analysis indicates that it was a 
mixture of failure of the advocators and a success of the opposition that led to 
this outcome. Blocher and Fischer had already in the early 1980s started to 
mobilize support at the electoral level with help of campaigns against an UN 
membership and thereby favouring the status quo. Pierre Aubert and following 
had not managed to inform the people about the extent, to which neutrality is 
influenced by a United Nations membership. Something that the opposition 
utilized well, as they primarily used neutrality as the main contra argument 
against a UN membership.  
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The counterfactual reasoning can be summarized as followed: the 
policyentrepreneurs, especially the social democratic foreign ministers, had 
successfully made use of the problems and attached their solutions to it which 
made the UN membership a prominent issue on the governmental agenda. The 
policyentrepreneurs had further managed to mobilize the support in the 
government as the UN proposal was adopted in the legislative. However failed 
to mobilize the support of the people in the UN referendum leading therefore to 
no change.  
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6 Concluding Discussion 
6.1 Common ground between the cases 
I will here discuss the similarities between the cases; the discussions are of 
qualitative nature as the empirical explanation is provided in only two cases.  
How can the cases combined contribute with an in-depth understanding of Swiss 
foreign policy and thereby offer plausible explanations to my general research 
question: 
 
• How can the decision-making process in Swiss foreign policy be 
explained? 
  
The explanatory variables identified in this thesis point in the direction of policy 
stability. In both case studies the commitment of the government towards the 
proposed changes in the foreign policy was great. However, as both case studies 
discuss the Swiss federal council needs the support of the federal assembly in 
order for a proposed change to occur. In light of Switzerland’s federalism this 
requires the approval of both chambers. At first, one would suspect that this is 
the real challenge to mobilize support in the legislative. The belief was therefore, 
that the cleavages in the federal assembly would be strong, both in the debate 
about the Swiss security report as well as in the UN membership. Especially 
because the Swiss foreign policy for decades had been based on military-
rationales, the move towards European Cooperation must therefore be 
considered as a huge step forwards. Adding that neutrality had been the core of 
Swiss foreign policy since 1815, this study assumed therefore that the debate in 
the federal assembly would be more intense, discussing these proposed changes 
more critically. But, as the results of both analyses indicate, the decision-making 
process in the Swiss federal assembly occurred without any greater problems 
reaching thereby consensus. The Swiss government as a whole favoured in both 
decision-making processes change, moving beyond the status quo. So, the 
proposed changes were politically salient, rather than the discussions about how 
the proposed changes affect neutrality. Both case studies highlight further that 
the small opposition emphasising the status quo, had no or only little impact on 
the decision-making process in the legislative.  
As both case studies imply the government as a whole favoured change, so 
where are the sufficient factors located explaining Swiss foreign policy stability? 
Both case studies identify the role of the people as important. In both case 
studies the referendum’s where identified as the most sufficient factor 
influencing the outcome. The analyses expose that the people favour rather the 
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status quo, and followed therefore not the recommendations of the government. 
One could therefore argue that the domestic struggle was a confrontation 
between the people and the government. In sum up, the argument presented here 
indicates that the support of the people is a necessary factor in order to move the 
Swiss foreign policy in the direction of change. Both case studies reach this 
conclusion. Further the role of the opposition was therefore great at the electoral 
level, especially the role of the Swiss People’s party. The party had no or only 
little impact on the decision-making process in the legislative arena became 
however, a prominent actor in the electoral level. One of the reasons for the 
success identified in the case studies is the mobilization of votes in the electoral 
level with help of extensive campaigns.  
 
6.2 Where do we go from here? 
Conducting a case study approach, as the one applied in this thesis has its 
limitations. It sacrifices breath for depth and can therefore not reach definite 
conclusions about other countries foreign policy. This was however never the 
ambition, as the aim was to explain the deviant case Swiss foreign policy 
stability. The structure of this thesis, conducting two case studies, each of which 
explains one particular event in the decision-making process using a different 
frame of reference. This outline did not only provide a broad understanding of 
the decision-making process in the Swiss foreign policy, the cases uncovered 
also additional insights about how alternative frameworks and alternative events 
can emphasize quite similar explanations. This thesis argues therefore about the 
importance of thinking outside the box, using an outline that fits the case and 
using theories outside the topic field that can contribute with new plausible 
explanations that otherwise would not have become visible. 
It would have been interesting to study the Swiss people’s party more in-
depth, as they are mentioned in both case studies. For instance, why has the 
right-wing populist Swiss people’s party increased its votes at the national 
elections since the end of the cold war? Examining the causal dynamics between 
the citizen’s initiatives and the Swiss people’s party, as both have increased 
during the last decades. 
Another interesting study would be to examine whether Switzerland actually 
during the last decade has become more cooperative. In 2002 they became 
members in the United Nations and have further also agreed on a variety of 
bilateral agreements as for example the Schengen agreement.  
   
  55 
7 Executive summary 
The end of the Cold War, has had a great impact on foreign policy. Former 
neutral states as Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Austria have during the last 
decades become more cooperative by joining the European Union and in line 
revised their security policy towards EU: s priorities (Agius-Devine, 201, 
Goetschel, 1999). As a consequence neutrality has in these countries 
successively over gone to non-alignment. Switzerland on the other side has since 
the end of the Cold War not abandoned it´s longstanding foreign policy of non-
membership. Switzerland is neither member in the European Union nor in the 
NATO, and became only recently member in the United States. The Swiss 
foreign policy offers therefore a puzzle in foreign policy, the source of this 
puzzlement is found in the context: decreasing territorial problems, greater 
interdependence between European States and increasing involvement of the EU 
and the NATO in foreign policy. 
 Given the uniqueness in the Swiss foreign policy as one of few European 
countries still containing a rather stable foreign policy this study aims to answer 
the following general research question: 
• How can the decision-making process in Swiss foreign policy be 
explained?   
The traditional theories in foreign policy engage in security issues rather 
on the international level. Especially the realistic perspective has dominated the 
topic, with contributions from the influential scholars Waltz (1979) and 
Mearsheimer (2001). The realistic assumption assumes that the state is a unitary 
actor, ignoring therefore that individual actors within the state create foreign 
policy involving rather a variety of actors. In this study I argue therefore that 
international factors offer no explanation to why the Swiss foreign policy is 
stable. This thesis assumes that individual policymakers establish foreign policy, 
analysing therefore the decision-making process within the state, at the domestic 
level.  
The changes in the international relations in foreign policy called the 
attention of a variety of scholars. This study is inspired by the work of Hermann 
(1990) and Goldmann (1988), however because Switzerland has not adapted to 
these changes I have used these models as an inspiration in order to find the 
independent variables in domestic politics. The models offer broad perspectives 
about foreign policy, containing a variety of important explanatory factors 
however being rather vague. In order to analyse the independent variables 
suggested by Hermann and Goldmann in depth, I have chosen Tsebelis’ Veto 
Player Theory (1995) and Kingdon’s Multiple Stream Framework (1984). Both 
theories provide an understanding about the decision-making process at the 
national level. The theories make use of Goldmann’s and Hermann’s domestic 
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explanatory factors, however they are established theories rather than vague 
models and therefore more suitable.  
It is however impossible to make use of a theoretical framework that is 
capable of explaining all type of foreign policy, therefore the ambition of this 
research has been to explain two particular decision-making processes in the 
Swiss foreign policy. The Swiss political system is often described as something 
special because of the combination of direct-democracy and federalism. 
Therefore analysing the veto player structures and their impact in the decision-
making process in the Swiss Security Report (1973, 1990, 2000 and 2010) with 
help of Tsebelis’ Veto Player theory (1995). On the other side the 1986 UN 
debate brought Swiss foreign policy on the political agenda, starting a heated 
debate in Switzerland that lasted for decades. Therefore analysing the decisions 
in the UN agenda-setting process with help of Kingdon’s Multiple Stream 
Framework (1984). 
In order to answer the general research question presented above, this thesis 
has therefore formulated two separate sub-questions, which give the outline for 
each case study. 
Case study 1 aims to answer the following research question: 
• What plausible explanations can Tsebelis’ Veto Player Theory contribute 
with in the Swiss Federal Assembly debate regarding the Swiss Security 
Report, 1973, 1990, 2000, 2010? 
Case study 2 aims to answer the following sub-question: 
• What plausible explanations can Kingdon´s Multiple Stream Framework 
contribute with in the 1986 UN debate? 
The research questions were explored through two case studies. Each case 
study analysing one particular decision-making process in the Swiss foreign 
policy (Security Report vs. UN agenda setting) making use of a different 
theoretical framework (Tsebelis’ vs. Kingdon). Two case studies were conducted 
because the aim was to analyse the broad picture of the Swiss foreign policy, 
both cases therefore contributing with explanations to the overall research 
question. In both case studies the content analysis was conducted, producing a 
descriptive overview of the decisions in the Swiss Security Report and the Swiss 
UN agenda-setting process.  
The following arguments where highlighted in the analysis of the 
Swiss veto player structures in the Swiss security report: 
• Three important institutional veto players were identified in the decisions 
about the Swiss security report, the two chambers in the Federal 
Assembly (National Council and State of Council) and the people through 
the referendum. All three have to agree to the proposed change. 
• The ideological distance among the parties is great, especially between 
the Social Democratic Party (SP) and the right-wing Swiss People’s Party 
(SVP). However because both parties occupy rather few seats in the 
Federal Assembly having therefore rather little impact on the decision-
making process. 
• The two biggest parties Christian Democratic Party (CVP) and Liberal 
Party (FDP) are both located rather in the middle of the left-right axes, 
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favouring therefore consensus. Internal cohesion was therefore rather 
small in the Federal Assembly regarding the Swiss security report.  
• All security reports (1973, 1990, 2000, 2010) were adopted in the 
legislative, the government favoured thereby change in the Swiss foreign 
policy. The analysis of the Swiss foreign policy referendums from 1986-
2010 discovered however, that the Swiss people in 13 of total 18 foreign 
policy referendums favoured the status quo. The people’s consent is 
required in order to change a policy, however because the people 
favoured in most cases the status quo, most of the proposed changes in the 
Swiss security report were not realized. 
The following arguments where highlighted in the analysis of the Swiss UN 
membership agenda-setting: 
• The UN debate became an issue on the governmental agenda because of 
three events: in 1966 the UN established some of its organizations in Geneva, 
in 1973 west and east Germany became members in the UN after being an 
active observer with Switzerland and in 1966 for the first time a social 
democratic politician (SP) held the position of foreign minister (the party 
strongly emphasises international cooperation) 
• The UN membership was however not forwarded to the decision agenda 
before decades later giving the foreign minister at that time Pierre Aubert 
(SP) the great possibility to mobilize support within the government. The UN 
proposal was successfully adopted in the Federal Assembly. 
• The opposition with Christoph Blocher and Otto Fischer had no success 
in the governmental agenda, however started early to mobilize the support of 
the people through extensive campaigns. The people rejected the UN 
referendum in 1986, revealing that the advocators had failed to persuade the 
people and therefore no change occurred. 
In both case studies the referendum’s where identified as the most sufficient factor 
influencing the outcome. In sum up, the argument presented here indicates that the 
support of the people is a sufficient factor in order to move the Swiss foreign policy in 
the direction of change. 
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